Ethnogenesis and Resource Competition Among Tibetan Refugees in South India

MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN

Although ethnicity has become one of the most actively studied problem areas in contemporary anthropology, there has been little research on the dynamics of ethnogenesis. This paper examines this process in reference to Tibetan refugee populations who have been settled in an agricultural scheme located in the State of Mysore. The position taken here is that the competition for resources that exists among these refugee populations, and between them and the Indian population, is one of the critical factors underlying the development of ethnic boundaries now operative both within and outside of the Tibetan community.

BACKGROUND

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a permanent Tibetan minority came into existence in India. Darjeeling, Kalimpong, Ladakh, Lahul, and areas of the North East Frontier Agency such as Tawang were incorporated, together with their indigenous populations, into British India. All of these populations, however, were absorbed as parts of territorial units with ongoing social and cultural systems and as such posed no great problem to the Government of India (GOI), which adopted a laissez faire attitude toward them.

I would like to express my appreciation to the American Institute of Indian Studies for supporting my research in India in 1966 and 1967. I would also like to thank the various officials of the DLG and the State Government of Mysore for their aid during this period. In particular, though, I would like to thank Mr. Chamba Taundru, Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama in the settlement, for without his sympathetic aid the research could not have been accomplished.
Beginning in 1959, however, a dramatic new factor emerged. In that year, as a result of internal disturbances in Chinese-controlled Tibet, the Dalai Lama together with many members of his government fled to India and the other Himalayan border states. Unlike the earlier instances of incorporation, these Tibetans were not part of intact territorial and sociocultural systems. They were an uprooted population and as such presented an immediate problem to the GOI with respect to their subsistence and housing. There could be no laissez faire attitude with respect to these helpless Tibetans, and most of the refugees were initially organized into transit camps. Today there are about 100,000 Tibetan refugees of whom 70,000 to 80,000 reside permanently in India.

The normally grim plight of refugee populations is greatly exacerbated when the refugees manifest either, or both, of the following characteristics: (1) a cultural tradition alien to that of the host country, and (2) a lack of special technological skills compatible with the labor needs of the host country.

If, following Goodenough (1970: 99), we take culture to be a "set of standards for perceiving, believing, evaluating, communicating and acting," then the impact of the first factor is self-evident. A refugee in a totally alien cultural matrix is like a person wearing the wrong glasses. His perceptions and evaluations of life around him, his norms for behavior, and his standards for communication are no longer efficacious. The myriad cues and clues that subtly mediate interpersonal interaction now distort and produce confusion and conflict. When, added to this, refugees do not possess special technological skills, their prospects for successful rehabilitation are very slim indeed. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the term "refugee" connotes a spectrum of dysfunctional, socially pathological traits such as homicide, suicide, alcoholism, and insanity. Unfortunately, all too often this stereotype is an accurate representation of the reality of the situation.

The Tibetans who entered India in 1959 possessed both debilitating characteristics. With the exception of a handful (mainly aristocrats) who spoke some English and/or Hindi, the refugees spoke only Tibetan. Meat-eating Buddhists from the cold climate of the Tibetan plateau, they found themselves thrust into the sweltering heat of vegetarian Hindu India. The refugees were nomads, monks, farmers, and petty traders, none of which occupations, on the surface, offered any competitive advantages in India. Almost all had no familiarity with modern industrial technology.

The obstacles facing the Tibetans were not just external ones. They came from widely disparate regions in Tibet where they spoke mutually unintelligible dialects, operated under different sociopolitical systems, and were traditionally hostile. Not only could Tibetans not communicate and interact freely with the Indians around them, in many instances they were hard pressed to do so among themselves.

Tibetans, therefore, entered India, a land already overburdened with massive poverty and unemployment, without language facility, without knowledge or understanding of Indian social and cultural systems, and without any potentially useful occupational skills. Their future looked anything but bright. But in point of fact, their initial adaptation to life in India has been very successful. The stereotyped refugee syndrome did not develop among Tibetans, and segments of the refugees have been very successfully rehabilitated, the most successful of the rehabilitation programs being the permanent agricultural settlement. The retention of traditional Tibetan sociocultural patterns in an unabashedly pluralistic adaptation stems from the interplay between traditional structures and new requirements. In particular, the retention of traditional patterns of political hierarchy and authority has afforded Tibetans tremendous competitive advantages in exploiting their new niche.

REHABILITATION

Before discussing the rehabilitation project, however, let me make a brief comment about the Dalai Lama and his "government" (DLG), and the policy of the GOI toward it and Tibetans in general. From the beginning the Dalai Lama and his officials interacted with the GOI on behalf of the Tibetan refugees. They immediately set themselves up as spokesmen for the mass of disparate refugees and even maintained offices in the transit camps. The GOI accepted this and was prepared to work with the Dalai Lama's staff, although only within clearly delimited parameters.

The GOI clearly did not want to recognize the Dalai Lama's organization as a de jure "government-in-exile." Even after the 1962 Chinese invasion of India, when the status and authority of the Dalai Lama's "government" soared, the GOI assiduously refused to accord it formal governmental status. In a similar vein the GOI also refused to resettle all Tibetans in one area in north India as the DLG had suggested. What is important to note, however, is that within these parameters the GOI adopted a very liberal attitude toward the administration of the Tibetans.

The GOI early made the fundamental decision to partake actively in efforts to rehabilitate the refugees. The next step obviously was to establish the ideological framework within which such rehabilitation should occur. If we view the options open to it as a continuum running between
the two poles of assimilation and pluralism, the GOI clearly opted for a policy which fell toward the "plural" end of the continuum. From the beginning, the policies of the GOI were not intended to discourage or destroy Tibetan cultural institutions and traditions. Working together with the DLG and a variety of foreign aid groups, the GOI launched a program of rehabilitation within a framework compatible with the maintenance of Tibetan culture.

The most successful of the rehabilitation strategies called for the creation of a series of permanent agricultural settlements throughout India. The idea was to resettle Tibetans in transit camps or working on road repair gangs and to provide them with assistance and resources so that within a period of five years they could become economically self-sufficient. This, if successful, would not only permanently take care of the refugee population, but it would also help India's food needs by bringing unused land under cultivation. However, considering the immense difficulty governments and agencies normally encounter in resettling populations even intraculturally, this goal for Tibetans in India was certainly one of Herculean proportions.

Although the GOI would not bring all Tibetans together into one area, it also did not want to scatter them in small family units (as, for example, the Canadian government is doing with their Tibetans). The proposed settlements were a kind of compromise, because their envisioned size of three to four thousand was large enough to sustain Tibetan language and other institutions easily.

The GOI further facilitated this cultural preservation by allowing Tibetans considerable internal autonomy and, in particular, by permitting the DLG to exercise administrative control over the settlements. This does not mean that the GOI abdicated its authority over the Tibetans, for it did not. Rather it means that the GOI (and the State Government) had no objection to giving the DLG de facto internal administrative control of the camps and to working with the DLG instead of with the individual refugees, so long as the latter did not object. From the beginning, then, two critical aspects of the GOI's policy toward the Tibetan refugees were (1) the liberal "non-assimilative" framework, and (2) the broad "delegated" authority of the Tibetan leadership headed by Tibet's former ruler, the Dalai Lama.

The first of the rehabilitation agricultural settlements was located in the state of Mysore on forest land which in the past had sustained agriculture. The land itself was donated on a ninety-nine year lease by the state government of Mysore under whose jurisdiction and authority the settlement fell. In the early summer of 1961, after the trees had been cut and removed, the first Tibetan settlers arrived in Mysore to start the work of building the agricultural community. This settlement, the first of its kind in India, is called Mundakuppe.²

The plan for Mundakuppe called for the development in stages, over a period of several years, of a settlement consisting of three thousand acres. This land was to be allocated on the basis of one acre per person so that, in the end, the settlement would hold around three thousand Tibetans. Internally, Mundakuppe was to be divided into six camps, each of which would hold five hundred acres. The refugees who came down to Mysore in 1961 formed Camps One and Two.

As mentioned earlier, Mundakuppe was expected to achieve economic self-sufficiency after five years. During the "learning-experimental" years, the settlers were assisted in a number of ways. The first and second year, when permanent houses were being constructed and the fields cleared for cultivation, the settlers were paid a daily salary in addition to a regular food ration. By the third year, when the fields were initially planted, they received half-wages and rations. For the fourth and fifth years they received only quarter-rations. In the sixth year, 1966, the settlers were on their own.

I arrived in Mundakuppe in January 1966, at precisely the point when the first two camps were entering the total self-sufficiency stage. There would be no subsidies for the crop they grew that year. Not surprisingly, that spring there was a great deal of anxiety among the villagers as the time for sowing drew near. These anxieties, however, turned out to be totally unwarranted. The harvest that year (as well as in subsequent years) was excellent, and the settlement has become a tremendous economic success. Let us turn, then, and examine the techno-materialistic basis of the economic adaptation at Mundakuppe.

Mundakuppe is located in Mysore State between the cities of Mysore and Arracrem. It lies on a flat plain at an elevation of about 2700 feet. It has a pleasant climate with relatively cool evenings and an average rainfall of about 35 inches, an amount sufficient to support only one crop a year.

The settlement is spread out on two sides of a paved motor highway (see Map 1) which has regular bus service. The four camps south of the highway (Camps I-IV) are separated from neighboring Indian villages by stretches of forest, but the land to the north of the road (Camps V and VI) is contiguous on the east with the fields of local Indians. There is a small town (Aganlashuk) of several thousand people about three miles

² This is a pseudonym.
northeast of the settlement on the main highway. At the point where the camp’s dirt road intersects with the motor highway, a small trade/administrative complex has developed consisting of the offices and living quarters of the officials of the state government and a variety of Indian shops and restaurants.

The settlement itself is divided into six camps, each consisting of five hundred acres of farm land and roughly the same number of Tibetans. Each camp has a nucleated residential complex of one hundred tile-roofed houses around which the fields are arranged. Although the arable land was internally allocated on an individual basis to all Tibetans over the age of four, the basic jural unit in the settlement is a “household.” Each household consists of five landholding persons who legally share one house. The household also possesses a number of agricultural tools as well as one draft animal for plowing. Because it is rare for a “real” family to coincide with the “legal” family, one house often contains two or more different and, not uncommonly, unrelated families. Neither the land nor the implements a person/household has can be sold. Furthermore, the land cannot be transmitted to one’s heirs. Upon death, the land reverts back to the settlement.

The settlers of Mundakuppe were recruited and selected by the DLG from transit and road gang camps in north India. Almost all the main regional/sub-cultural groupings and social strata in Tibet are represented in the settlement. There are former “taxpayer” serfs, duigang serfs, traders, servants, craftsmen, monks, and various types of “unclean” castes. Although many of the settlers in Camp One have had previous agricultural experience in Tibet, this is not generally the case, and taking the settlement as a whole, the majority of settlers have had no prior farming experience.

The local staple crop is a variety of millet called raji. Although Tibetans much prefer barley or wheat as food, because these cannot grow in Mysore, they have grudgingly adopted raji as their main food crop. The technology associated with raji cultivation, including the somewhat difficult transplanting process, was readily learned.

Aside from its taste, the main shortcoming of raji is its relatively low yield potential. On the average, raji yields only about 600 kilograms per acre and rarely exceeds 1000 kilograms per acre. Since raji sold (in 1966/1967) for about 70 cents (naya paisa) per kilogram, the gross monetary return per acre (using the 600 kilogram yield figure) comes to about 420 rupees.

Because of this low potential, various “experts” advised the cultivation of a more lucrative cash crop. Cotton and tobacco were tried but problems in procurement of seed and marketing led to their discontinuance. In 1966, a technical advisor recommended hybrid maize as an ideal crop. Although this idea met with considerable opposition from the settlers who remembered their previous experiences with cotton and tobacco and who were apprehensive about the large cash outlay maize requires for fertilizer, some were finally persuaded to plant maize and these were rewarded with a bumper crop. Since then maize accounts for about half of the acreage under cultivation.

Maize yields are much higher than those of raji. Two thousand kilograms per acre is not unusual and the yields can run up to 3000 kilograms...
per acre. If we take 1600 kilograms per acre and 60 cents (naya paisa) as the average yield and selling price, the gross monetary value of one acre of maize is about 960 rupees. After deducting the approximately 250 rupees paid per acre for fertilizer, seed, etc., the net yield of 700 rupees is still higher than even the gross figure for *ragi*. Maize is clearly a more lucrative crop.

We can get an idea of the relationship between this agricultural base and consumption requirements by looking at what the situation would be for a hypothetical family of three (with three acres). If they planted half maize and half *ragi*, their yield (taking the averages cited above) would be 2400 kilograms of maize and 900 kilograms of *ragi*. If they ate grain three times a day they would consume about 750 kilograms in a year (about 2 kilograms per day). Since Tibetans do not normally use maize flour, this would leave from the *ragi* yield about 150 kilograms. In addition to their grain needs, such a family would spend about 90 rupees a month (600 a year) on other foodstuffs such as oil, butter, milk, cigarettes, etc. Subtracting this from the 1050 rupees the maize yield converts to, the net cash remainder is 450 rupees. When the remaining 150 kilograms of *ragi* is similarly converted to a cash figure, the total profit for the three acres would be around 550 rupees.

Evidence from consumption patterns and standard of living bears out the contention that the settlement has been economically successful. In the period 1965–1967, there was a marked increase in consumption of what, in the settlement context, can be considered luxury items. Many of the Tibetan families who shared houses with other families moved out to their fields where they built new residences from their own funds. Those who had already moved to the fields made improvements such as replacing thatched roofs with tile roofs. There was considerable investment in new furniture and household possessions. Bicycles, and even some horses, became more and more common among the villagers. Gambling (na jong and Tibetan dice) re-emerged although it had been initially banned. Furthermore, there was a tremendous increase in the use of Indian manual labor for field work. In spring and fall literally scores of Indians came daily to the camp seeking day-wage farm employment from Tibetans. A number of more affluent Tibetans were beginning to develop permanent employer/employee relations with particular Indians. Similarly, in 1967 it was becoming more common for impoverished young Indian boys to be taken in by Tibetan families. In return for room and board these Indian youths would do a variety of household tasks such as hauling drinking water from the wells. Another index of relative affluence can be seen in the way Mundakuppe has become a regular route for numerous Indian beggars, some of whom have gone so far as to learn to chant Tibetan prayers in Tibetan.

Mundakuppe's economic success has involved a delicate blending of traditional technology and customs with the increasingly effective utilization of modern agro-business technology. For example, on the traditional side, one type of plowing is done much as it was in Tibet with two-animal draft teams pulling a traditional type plow. Similarly, Tibetan methods of winnowing and threshing have been retained as have agricultural customs such as work songs. On certain days an observer would be hard pressed to know he was really in India and not in Tibet or some Himalayan kingdom.

On the other hand, Tibetans have been very open to change and have adopted a variety of both local Indian techniques and modern agricultural technology. The settlement has a cooperative society which has fourteen tractors and four trucks (run and maintained by Tibetans) and uses sophisticated hybrid maize seeds, different types of chemical fertilizers, and insecticides. The land has been contour bunded and there has been considerable development of tractor plowing by contours rather than by household holdings. There are several rat-proof grain warehouses which are used to maximize marketing profit. For example, one year the cooperative society took a 300,000 rupee loan from a bank to buy grain from the settlers at harvest time to be held until later in the year when the price would rise. Part of the profit difference was then redistributed among the farmers.

Economic self-sufficiency, however, is not the only criterion of successful resettlement and rehabilitation. Equally important are the cultural and psychological dimensions. In Mundakuppe, the continuity and vitality of Tibetan culture has been very successfully maintained. The Tibetan language is universally used in the settlement and all children learn not only Tibetan history and religion but also how to read and write the Tibetan language at a high level of proficiency. Similarly, Tibetan religion flourishes. Monks, lamas, and shamans function and there are several temples and monasteries. Religious rites and ceremonies are regularly performed, and the values and world view underlying the system are firmly accepted. Tibetan "national" identity is in many ways stronger and more explicit than it ever was in Tibet and there is tremendous pride in Tibetan culture and religion, as well as in the achievements of Mundakuppe. Tibetans feel no sense of inferiority vis à vis the Indians around them.

There is also very little manifestation of the dysfunctional behavior commonly associated with the "refugee" syndrome. There is little incidence of mental and emotional disorders and no incidence of alcoholism.
Crimes of property are few and occur within normal distribution parameters. Even though most of the Tibetans now realize it is not likely they will return to Tibet in their lives, the overall attitude of the people is positive.

This cultural adaptation has taken place along three lines. One of the most important of these has been the development of standards for intracultural interaction between Tibetans from the many diverse subcultural areas present in the settlement. Mundakuppe is a classic example of ethnic boundaries existing within ethnic boundaries. A kind of segmentary ethnicity has emerged. Within the Tibetan community, the major subcultural ethnic groups such as Khampas are clearly maintaining their identity vis à vis the other Tibetan groups although standards for intracultural (Tibetan) interaction have developed. For example, Lhasa Tibetan has come to be used as a *lingua franca* in the camp.

The second and equally important line of change has been the accommodation of traditional Tibetan political and social patterns to the democratic laws and institutions operative in India. For example, the DLG has written a constitution which, among other things, incorporates intra-ethnic (Tibetan) elections.

The third factor concerns Indo-Tibetan interaction. It is the least important of the three because Tibetan interaction with Indians has been restricted to fleeting encounters in the market place and sporadic contact in employer/employee situations where the Tibetans are in the dominant positions. There has been no interethnic development of personal or intimate relations, and marriage has been characterized by endogamy.

Space again precludes further discussion of these adaptations. In summary, however, the initial adaptation process in Mysore can be characterized as pervasive pluralism. Tibetan culture and identity have been conspicuously maintained and interethnic contact is almost completely limited to economic spheres. There has been virtually no assimilation to Indian cultural and social institutions. Concomitantly, there has been the impressive economic adaptation which combines traditional and modern agrobusiness techniques to exploit successfully the energy potential of a traditional niche. The economic success of the Tibetans is one of the most striking accomplishments of the program.

But what of the local Indian attitude to all this? Aliens are brought to their area and equipped with modern mechanized technology not available to them. These aliens not only become economically well off, but vigorously maintain their strange and alien cultural traditions. On the surface, this seems a fertile matrix for interethnic resentment, hostility, and conflict.

Whether or not there are strong feelings of resentment among local Indians is difficult to determine but, if so, it has not assumed behavioral significance. There have been few overt manifestations of hostility and conflict. Tibetans have generally had distant but cordial relations with local Indians and certainly do not feel unwelcomed or mistreated in the local area. The Tibetans, whose settlement has four stores run by their own cooperative society, regularly attend the weekly Indian market and go to the local Indian town. On any given day they can be seen shopping and going about their business in town. Because most of the older Tibetans know no Kannada, several of the Indian shopkeepers have actually learned a few words of Tibetan to facilitate business. Relations with the state government of Mysore have been very close and the Mysore government has shown an amazing capacity to understand and support the Tibetan population in Mundakuppe (and the other locations where Tibetans have been placed in Mysore). Local Tibetans genuinely have positive attitudes toward the Mysore government and India in general, and a number indicated that they would prefer to remain in Mysore rather than return to Tibet as it was under the old system (serfdom). All, however, would return under the new system.

How, then, do we account, on the one hand, for the economic, cultural, and psychological achievements of Tibetans in Mundakuppe and, on the other hand, for the absence of hostility and conflict between the Tibetans and the local Indians? Although a variety of factors, such as the policy of the GOI and the availability of resources, are relevant for this question, one factor — the internal political organization of the refugees — stands out as basic. In the new social and physical environment of India, the preservation of certain traditional Tibetan cultural patterns immediately offered the refugees competitive advantages. I contend that, in particular, traditional Tibetan political structure possesses a high "adaptive capacity" and is the single most important variable underlying the successful initial adaptation of the Tibetans. Let us, therefore, examine briefly aspects of both the traditional and the new (emergent) political structures.

The most important politico-economic institution in Tibet was serfdom. Except for a few hundred families of lords and religious corporate institutions, the remainder of the lay Tibetan population were serfs (mi-ser) of one sort or another, and these serf statuses were basically ascribed, that is, recruitment occurred automatically at birth through parallel descent lines. Serfs owed substantial service obligations to their lords who, in turn, were obligated to protect and provide subsistence for the serfs, this subsistence generally taking the form of arable land.

As in feudal Europe, the most important politico-economic resource
The central government was clearly dominated by religious orientations and personnel. The ruler, the Dalai Lama, was a bodhisattva (Avalokiteshvara) who Tibetans believe has renounced his own nirvana to help all sentient creatures in general, and Tibetans in particular, to achieve final enlightenment. Furthermore, the regents who ruled in the Dalai Lama’s infancy were also high incarnate lamas, and half of the governmental bureaucracy were monk officials recruited from the great Gelugpa monasteries around Lhasa. The overall orientation of the state, if there was one, was to promote the development of religion in Tibet. It was to provide a matrix conducive to the practice of religion. The entire governmental structure was thus intertwined with religion and its various legitimacy depended to a large extent on it.

It was from this type of social system that Tibetans entered India by the thousands in 1959. From the beginning, as was indicated earlier, the old Tibetan government interceded with the GOI on behalf of Tibetans and succeeded in obtaining its consent to organize the refugees. Mundakuppe stands as one of the positive consequences of this détente between the Dalai Lama and the GOI.

In contrast to the traditional Tibetan social system, the new system in Mundakuppe emphasizes equality. All traditional ascribed differences have been legally eliminated. All the settlers have one acre of nonhereditary land whether they be beggars or wealthy traders in Tibet. Although former status differences continue to be recognized by some, and although notions of pollution persist, the jural and economic forces that supported these have been completely eliminated. These changes have been actively supported by the Dalai Lama and his government.

This democratic equality is, however, overlaid with political patterns of authority and hierarchy characteristic of the traditional Tibetan political system. There are no longer serfs and lords, and there are elections in the camp, but there is also paternalistic hierarchical rule.

As was described earlier, the settlement is divided into six camps each consisting of five hundred acres and five hundred persons (one hundred houses with five land-holding persons per house). The administrative hierarchy in the settlement consists of four levels of officials. The lowest level is the cugpon (becu dpon) or ‘head of ten’. As his name implies, he represents ten households (fifty persons) and is concerned mainly with organizing labor “tax” obligations. These officials are elected annually and there are ten in each camp.

---

8 For a more detailed discussion of the traditional Tibetan social system see the author’s articles listed in the references.

9 The transliteration system used here follows that described by T.V. Wylie (1959).
A more important official is the chi-mi (spyi mi) or camp leader. Each camp has two such officials who are elected on an annual basis. They receive a salary of 60 rupees a month which was initially collected from the residents of the camp but was later paid by the Cooperative Society.

Finally, there are the three gardu (gsar 'byas). These officials represent the three major ethnic subcultural areas: central Tibet (dbus gsungs), eastern Tibet (khams or mdo smad) and northeastern Tibet (ando or mdo stod). They are elected for three-year terms and receive a monthly salary of 100 rupees from the DLG.

Above these positions are the appointees of the DLG. Chief among these is the camp leader. Unlike the lower camp officials, he is not a settler (has no land) and is not elected. He is, rather, an official of the DLG who was appointed by it to head the settlement. The camp leader during the time I was there was, in fact, a former monk official in the traditional Tibetan government. The camp leader heads an office called döncö legyung (don good las khangs) which contains a number of subordinate employees such as an English interpreter and a Tibetan secretary, and is considered a part of the DLG which pays the salary of the officials. These officials are also not settlers but rather members of the DLG. Parallel but subordinate to the bureau office is the Cooperative Society. It also is headed by an official of the DLG who is under the camp leader and works hand-in-hand with him.

The camp leader is in charge of the overall administration of the settlement. Appointed by the DLG, he represents the needs of the settlers as a corporate collectivity to both the DLG and the Indian and foreign sectors. He and his staff plan and implement policy for the settlement with respect not only to technical-agricultural-marketing matters but also to social-cultural matters. For example, the use of beef and the playing of gambling games (dice and “big ma jong”) have been forbidden in the settlement. Internally, the camp leader attempts to integrate and articulate the various diverse subcultural units and to present to them the policies and views of the DLG. He also plays an important role in maintaining the peace by using the prestige of his office to mediate disputes and altercations. Moreover he often acts on behalf of individuals in their dealings with Indian legal and political officials. In many ways, then, although the differences are as important as the similarities, the camp leader plays a role analogous to that of the district commissioner or estate steward in Tibet, and Mundakuppe resembles in some ways the type of estate in Tibet where the serfs (dbyung) held only small plots of land for their lifetime. This resembles has not been lost on the settlers who jokingly refer to the rare settlement labor obligations (e.g. mending fences) by the name used for corvée taxes (sitra) in Tibet. Similarly, the kinship patterns that have emerged in Mundakuppe follow those manifested by this type of serv in Tibet.

Mundakuppe is certainly not a feudal estate and the Tibetan settlers living there are not serfs, but the continuity in the type of hierarchical, appointive administrative leadership is striking. Although there has been a genuine democratization of many traditional Tibetan institutions, particularly with respect to land tenure, the camp leader’s position represents a clear continuity with traditional Tibetan superordinate authority statuses.

As many anthropologists have pointed out in recent years, the retention of traditional sociocultural patterns in new environments is a function of the advantages they yield. Traditional sociocultural systems have different adaptive capacities in their new contexts and the manner and degree in which they are maintaineds depend on the competitive advantages they provide their holders. With respect to Tibetan refugees in the initial phases of contact, the Dalai Lama and his officials offered indisputable competitive advantages.

The Dalai Lama was an internationally known religio-political leader whose flight to India had drawn worldwide attention to the Tibetan situation. His exalted stature permitted him to negotiate with the GOI from a position of relative strength and facilitated the development of widespread lines of communication with numerous private and governmental personages and agencies both in India and abroad. Moreover, the ready availability of a core of highly experienced and competent governmental administrators provided the Tibetans a ready-made organization through which resources could be effectively aggregated and policy decided on and implemented. The DLG was able to monitor and coordinate activities and needs of Tibetan refugees all over India, as well as in Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal. The DLG offered the scattered Tibetan refugees a centralized and efficient organization that could integrate and represent their needs. This it has certainly done.

The very existence of a settlement in Mysore is an excellent example of this. The DLG, in conjunction with the GOI and various foreign aid agencies, developed the idea of resettling Tibetans permanently throughout India and worked out the specific details with respect to size, area, economic resources, etc. The DLG, furthermore, was responsible for implementing this policy within the Tibetan community. It convinced Tibetans to go to Mysore, an area which from North India seemed the
end of the world. It also sent its officials to Mundakuppe in advance of the settlers and from the beginning organized activities internally and coordinated interaction with the Mysore and national governments. As needs and problems emerged, it was the representatives of the DLG who intervened and negotiated at length on whatever level was necessary. Given the traditional intrastratum individualism of Tibetan peasants, it is inconceivable that they could have so rapidly and effectively developed a leadership structure like that of the DLG. For example, even the DLG failed abysmally when they attempted in 1964 to institute communal (cooperative) labor in Mundakuppe. No one wanted to work for “the others.”

However, unlike the old system, in Mundakuppe the settlers do not hold their land on the basis of tax and corvée obligations to a lord or the Tibetan government. Rather, each settler holds his acre from the GOI (and the Mysore State government) for the duration of his life regardless of whether he complies with the commands or decisions of the camp leader (or the DLG). This is the paradox of Mundakuppe. While on the surface there is political continuity in the form of a centralized hierarchical authority, in reality the hierarchical authority is extremely tenuous.

The DLG found, and finds itself today, in the unenviable position of having no legal or constitutional status with respect to Indian law, and consequently it is not able to use coercive force to compel acquiescence with their policies. Its continued operation as a government depends completely on the voluntary compliance of the refugees, which, in turn, depends on the refugees’ perceived self-interests and on their belief in the legitimacy of the DLG. But, even in the initial stages of the refugee situation, the latter was not completely unproblematic because significant numbers of refugees either had not been traditionally under the political authority of the DLG or had only recently come under it. It comes as no surprise, then, to find that the DLG has consistently and energetically attempted to reinforce these two general factors. The attempts of the DLG, however, are in large part responsible for the pluralistic character of the Tibetan’s adaptation. It is my contention that the needs of the DLG in its new setting have produced policies that have been a powerful force for maintaining the initial ethnic differences and generating new ones. Let us first examine the self-interest variable.

The DLG actively attempted to aggregate relief funds for the refugees. It maintains offices not only in New Delhi but also in Geneva (where many of the relief agencies have headquarters) and New York City. It also publishes and distributes an English language newsletter throughout the world. Through its amazing intra-Indian and international organizational network, it has access to those in control of funds, and it has been very successful in convincing them to recognize and deal with it as the legitimate leadership structure of the Tibetans. With two minor exceptions, dissenting groups of Tibetans have had little success in obtaining funds.

The DLG is also an important source of employment. It hires (for itself and foreign sponsored projects) numerous Tibetans in various roles. It has maintained the traditional prestigious titles and honorifics of government service but has opened service up to all strata. Thus, one of the present council ministers was formerly a serf of one of the former council ministers. The DLG also, to a large extent, monopolizes access to educational scholarships both in India and abroad.

In Mundakuppe this same pattern exists. In addition to the existence of the camp itself, the office of the Dalai Lama (the camp leader) has managed in a few short years to procure for the settlers tractors, trucks, scarce hybrid seeds, chemical fertilizers, a medical clinic, electricity (1968–1969), grinding mills, and so forth. The DLG has literally delivered the goods to its constituency.

But while efforts to sustain old and discover new sources of aid continue, it is the ideological dimension that lies at the heart of the dynamics of the adaptation of Tibetans to India. The strategy of the DLG in this respect has taken several directions, all of which are oriented to maintaining cultural and social-relational boundaries. The DLG has actively sought to maintain Tibetan social and cultural patterns and has fostered a rigidly bounded plural adaptation for Tibetans.

The ideological policies of the DLG can be analytically separated into three main dimensions:

1. The development of an intense feeling of Tibetan cultural and political nationalism among Tibetans;
2. The maintenance and expansion of the charisma and stature of the Dalai Lama; and
3. The fostering of social, political, and economic boundaries.

Nationalism is a rather new phenomenon for Tibetans. For centuries in Tibet the relevant variable was not that of Tibet versus other national entities but rather that of subcultural segments in conflict and opposition. A good example of this is the term used for Tibet itself: bod pa. Actually, this term, even in 1959, was used by eastern Tibetans to refer only to central Tibetans. They considered themselves khams pa (eastern Tibetans) rather than bod pa, and many of them actively sought to remain, or become, independent of the Tibetan (Dalai Lama’s) government. Among the Tibetans who arrived in India in 1959, the idea of a Tibetan national identity was very poorly developed.

One factor immediately altering this state of affairs was the vivid reali-
zation of the fundamental similarities shared by all Tibetans that came as
the result of their sudden immersion into the midst of a sea of Indians.
The vast sociocultural distances initially felt to exist between the various
Tibetan subcultural groups were significantly diminished, and this new
awareness became an important foundation for the DLG's vigorous
advocation of a Tibetan "national" (ethnic and political) identity.

Through its publications, such as the daily newspaper and the monthly
newsmagazine, and through its control of the teaching staff and education-
al materials used in the Tibetan section of the system, the DLG has
effectively promoted the idea of a Tibetan nation and people, particularly
among the young. Day in and day out this idea is expressed in the media
and schools. Pride in one's language, customs, religious institutions, one's
"modernized" government, and of course, in His Holiness, the Dalai
Lama, are constant themes.

A new national anthem has been created which is sung daily in the
schools and at public meetings. A new national holiday (March 10) com-
memorating the uprising of the Tibetan people against the Chinese in 1959
has also played an important part in mobilizing national sentiments. This
March 10 holiday has been observed through various kinds of political
demonstrations, some confined to the Tibetan settlements but many
involving local Indian communities. Competition has developed between
the various Tibetan communities as to which can produce the best cele-
bration program, and this has been encouraged by the DLG which pub-
lishes detailed reports from each settlement on their activities. The scope
of some of these celebrations is surprising. For example, in 1967 in
Mundakuppe, the camp leader organized a massive truck demonstration
for Mysore City. Fourteen open-topped trucks were rented and decorated
with political slogans and statements. Handbills explaining in English the
significance of the holiday were printed, and tapes reading the explana-
tion were made in English, Kannada, Urdu, and Tibetan. Hundreds of
Tibetans were loaded into the trucks and given the handbills to distribute
while the tapes blared out the message through a portable public address
system attached to the camp leader's car (which led the procession). For
several hours these trucks drove throughout the city of Mysore, even
stopping in front of the local Communist Party office. It was a great
success and the Tibetans were received sympathetically by the local Indi-
ans. Although it was turning dark when the trucks returned to the settle-
ment, the Tibetans who had to stay behind lined the settlement road and
gave the participants a hero's welcome. It was a moving and uniting
experience for the settlers.

A related theme is that of "returning to the homeland." Although the

DLG has advocated making the best of life in India, it has also vigorously
maintained the position that there is hope of returning. The office of the
DLG in New York has acted as a liaison with the United Nations and
there have been repeated attempts to bring up the Tibetan question before
that body. The various resolutions on human self-determination have
been proclaimed by the Tibetan media as steps on the road of return to
their country. The Tibetan media has given detailed, if not always accu-
rate, coverage to the United Nations activities related to the Tibetan
question.

Similarly, there has been a constant effort in the media to retain the
idea of an overriding Tibetan nation by keeping before the people the
plight of the Tibetan "brethren" left behind. There has been a steady diet
of "eyewitness" accounts of the situation in Tibet by recent refugees; all
having the theme of how lucky the refugees are in India and how the
downtrodden brothers left in Tibet still believe in the Dalai Lama and
earnestly desire a free Tibet headed by the Dalai Lama. Concomitantly,
the Tibetan media continually expound on how the Chinese communists
are trying to eradicate the Tibetan race in Tibet. It is, therefore, the duty
of the refugees, led by the Dalai Lama and his government, to maintain
the greatness and vitality of the Tibetan race and culture-nation.6

Underlying these perspectives is the theme of rgyal shen or patriotism
to the Tibetan cause. Support and compliance with the DLG is considered
patriotic, whereas opposition and disagreement is considered traitorous
because it allegedly harms the "Tibetan cause." The refugees have been
continually exhorted in the media to exhibit true patriotism for Tibet
(i.e. the DLG).

Another dimension of the development of a dynamic national con-
sciousness has been the fostering of pride in selected Tibetan cultural
traditions and a concerted attempt to maintain these in the alien socio-
cultural matrix. Obviously, however, not all traditional cultural paraph-
ernalia are compatible with the new "system" within whose parameters the
DLG must act. For example, serfdom has no place in the "classless and
casteless" ideology of the GOI. This feature of Tibetan society has been
treated as a disgrace and is discussed with outsiders only with reticence.
The attitude of Tibetan leaders and even peasants is that it is best for-
gotten.

This reticence instantly vanishes, however, when the conversation turns
to Tibetan religion for it is this that all Tibetans hold up as the epitome

4 For example, the following is a typical statement found in a recent Tibetan news-
paper: ngsor tsho ni gzhigs las bod mi'1 re yul gyig po yin([We are the only hope of the
Tibetans left behind in Tibet].)
of Tibetan cultural brilliance. Tibetans generally feel that their religion is superior to all others. The many foreigners who subscribe to Tibetan religion are the living proof for them of the inherent superiority of the "Tibetan way." Consequently, the DLG has actively and financially supported Tibetan religious and monastic institutions in India and has subtly encouraged the elimination of "little tradition" animistic elements such as oracles, shamans, etc. It has striven to keep monks together and to maintain monastic knowledge and learning and has financed a great deal of scholarship and publication in the religious sphere.

This elevation of religion to a place of intellectual and emotional superordination among the refugees leads us to the second dimension mentioned earlier, namely, the sustenance of the status of the Dalai Lama. For Tibetans who were adults when they came to India, the stature of the Dalai Lama was given. He was a great charismatic leader, the emanation of the bodhisattva deity, Avalokitesvara, incarnated into human form to help Tibetans in particular and mankind in general to advance along the path to salvation. His presence, of course, was one of the main legitimizing factors underpinning the traditional government. In India, however, with the reconstitution of the DLG as a political entity devoid of either legal foundation or control of force, the legitimizing role of the Dalai Lama has become even more important than in Tibet, particularly among the new generation of refugees. Belief in the sanctity and extraordinariness (charisma) of the Dalai Lama and his rightful role of ruler had to be enculturated into the refugee youths and maintained among the adults if the DLG were to sustain itself in its new context.

This has been very successfully accomplished. Although many factors are relevant here, one of the most important has been the virtual monopolization by the DLG of informational input to the settlers. Through the school system and various publications, the reputation and accomplishments of the Dalai Lama have been consistently exalted. The Dalai Lama has been portrayed not only as the symbol or quintessence of Tibetan national identity but also as the patron of the Tibetan people who is directly responsible for their successful adaptation in India and their future expectations. There has been in-depth coverage of the activities of the Dalai Lama, and in many cases his speeches have been reprinted as separate pamphlets. Similarly, all Tibetan school children start their school day by singing, along with the national anthem, a prayer song composed by the Dalai Lama. Whatever the religious merit of the song, it is unquestionably associated in the minds of Tibetans with the Dalai Lama himself.

Deep belief and unaltering reverence for the Dalai Lama are manifested continuously by the people. In Mundakuppe, for example, the stereotyped phrase "by the kindness of the Dalai Lama" precedes almost all comments on the state of the refugees in India. All successes are attributed to the grace of the Dalai Lama. I have seen even very highly westernized Tibetans spontaneously prostrate themselves before the Dalai Lama. This continued belief in the Dalai Lama (which in some senses borders on cult fervor) as both the spiritual and the political leader has played a critical role in providing the DLG the legitimacy it needs to obtain compliance from the people for its policies. Perhaps the best indication of the overall success of this policy is the fact that starting from about 1968–1969, a voluntary program of taxation (literally: zhal 'debs or 'donations') was introduced by the DLG. This program has met with acceptance both throughout the refugee settlements in India and among Tibetans abroad. As usual, the Tibetan language media play an important role in sustaining this by publicizing donors and encouraging "friendly" competition between the different communities.

The development of strong feelings of national identity and the enhancement of the stature of the Dalai Lama have gone hand in hand with an attempt to maintain cultural and politicoeconomic boundaries. The DLG certainly does not encourage or support policies that facilitate intimate contact and interaction with aliens, either Indians or Europeans. Endogamy is vigorously encouraged and is intertwined with generalized notions of nationalism, in that it is portrayed as absolutely fundamental to the preservation of the Tibetan race, a race endangered by the actions of the communists in Tibet.

One of the most important policies of the DLG relevant to boundary maintenance concerns language. The DLG has energetically supported the use and teaching of Tibetan within the refugee community. The school system does a truly excellent job of teaching literary Tibetan to the refugee youth on a high level of proficiency, and the literacy rates among the young are extremely high. For the older refugees there are night schools that teach enough so that a person can read the newspapers (whose importance to the DLG has been indicated above). Spoken Tibetan is used throughout the Tibetan communities and in Mundakuppe the language is used not only in intimate, family contexts but everywhere in the camp in all situations. The settlers do not need to know any other language and most of the older ones do not. The camp leader's office (i.e. the DLG) provides the linguistic expertise and channels through which Tibetans can deal with Indians and Europeans.

Another aspect of boundary maintenance concerns the DLG's attitude toward Indian citizenship. Here we find, not surprisingly, that the DLG
has taken a strong stand against Tibetans taking Indian citizenship even though this would seem to afford Tibetans competitive advantages. The current stateless status of the Tibetans places them under a variety of disadvantages with respect to such things as land ownership, business licenses, and freedom of movement within India. The DLG, however, has maintained the position that Tibetans taking Indian citizenship would diminish the strength of the refugees' claims to Tibet. Taking Indian citizenship, therefore, is considered as a renunciation of Tibetan cultural and national aspirations and is actively opposed. It is obvious, however, that a consequence of this policy (whether intentional or not) is the greater dependence of the refugees on the DLG. Because as individuals Tibetans are stateless "guests" of the GOI, their strength lies in their collectivity, and it is precisely the role of the Dalai Lama and the DLG to organize and represent that collectivity.

On the local (Mundakuppe) scene, an important policy concerns economic alternatives. In the initial phases of the settlement the camp leader and the GOI felt that it was critical for the refugees to focus all their attention on learning the necessary agricultural skills. To facilitate this, a policy was instituted whereby Tibetans were not permitted to engage in other private jobs or businesses either in the camp or in the neighboring areas. This, it was felt, would preclude the many refugees who had been traders in Tibet from seeking to earn their living in this way rather than from the land. Since the Mysore government refrained from issuing licences for shops, etc., without the recommendation of the camp leader (DLG), the settlers in fact were forced to devote all their attention to their land.

By 1966, however, this rule had outlived its utility. The settlement was an agricultural success but, as we shall see, needed supplementary sources of financial input which independent businesses could have offered. Yet the rule was not rescinded. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that by 1966–1967, the initially nonpolitical policy had taken on manifest political dimensions. This policy obviously greatly increased the dependence of the settlers on the DLG since it eliminated one type of independent economic alternative. By making the settlers completely dependent on their land, the power of the DLG was enhanced because it, through the camp leader and the Cooperative Society, controlled the tractors, seeds, fertilizers, and the technical knowledge that supported the complex agro-business approach used in the camp. There were, in fact, several instances during my stay in the settlement when political opposition groups were refused permission to open small businesses in the nearby Indian town. This raises the question of negative sanctions. So far, we have examined only the DLG's use of positive or persuasive strategies. As one would expect, the DLG also employed negative sanctions. Basically, it used its control of resources to apply pressure on individuals to comply with its policies. For example, political opponents of the DLG find that their children do not receive scholarships for higher education or jobs in government related activities. An example from Mundakuppe will illustrate how such sanctions were employed in the settlements.

In 1963, the Cooperative Society was incorporated under the control of the camp leader and the DLG. Its membership was to consist of all the land-holding settlers, each of whom was supposed to purchase at least one 10-rupee share. While most of the Tibetans did this, a number did not. Not surprisingly, almost all of those who did not buy shares were from a subcultural area traditionally hostile to the DLG and a religious sect different from that of the Dalai Lama. In addition to these people, a number of others from that region had come to the settlement subsequent to the initial membership drive.

In 1966, the camp leader and the head of the Cooperative Society decided to try to increase the membership of the cooperative, particularly among that dissident segment. They used as leverage their control over rationed goods. The state government administered the ration quotas through agents who could pay for the goods in a lump sum and see to their collection and distribution. The Cooperative Society took on this job for the settlement. The items involved were important ones in the diet of the Tibetans, including such things as wheat and sugar. The camp leader, then, in 1966 informed the people that it would not issue rations to persons who were not members of the society as this was not fair to those who had paid for their shares. Because the nonmembers wanted these foodstuffs, they were effectively forced to join to obtain them.

These, then, comprise the main ways the DLG has attempted to maintain its authority. While changes have occurred in the traditional political system, political continuity in terms of hierarchical elitist authority is the single most important factor underlying the Tibetans successful adaptation. The pluralistic nature of the adaptation can be seen to result partly from the policies of the GOI but mainly from the policies and strategies of the DLG. The general pluralistic accommodation of Tibetans in Mundakuppe is as much a byproduct of political prerequisites as a valued end in itself.

But what of Indo-Tibetan contact within this adaptation? The relations between the two ethnic groups have been cordial. There has been no significant hostility or conflict even though the Tibetans share the same niche with Indians and are competing for resources with the Indians.
Part of the answer to this has already been discussed. The "farming only" policy of the DLG not only strengthened the office but also artificially delimited a sub-niche for the Tibetans. By voluntarily relinquishing one major economic arena to the local population, the seemingly inevitable interethnic competition for resources has been decreased, if not eliminated. Consequently, the tremendous economic development of the surrounding area, particularly the town of Aganlashuk, has been controlled by Indians. By limiting themselves to the roles of primary producer and consumer, the Tibetans have provided the indigenous Indians a whole new source of wealth and income. This has aided the merchant class as well as others since the development of new and the expansion of old service industries has created many new jobs.

The coming of Tibetans has transformed the sleepy town of Aganlashuk into a bustling trade and business center. Moreover, during the two-year period I was in Mundakuppe, a new business area was developing at the intersection of the motor highway and the camp dirt road. What was initially a small administrative complex of the government of the state of Mysore had grown considerably; by the time I left it comprised several restaurants, grocery stores, and a bicycle repair and sales shop.

The presence of Tibetans has also benefited the poor landless Indians by affording them a new source of employment: working for Tibetans. Hundreds of Indians (men, women, and children) work in the fields for Tibetans on a day-wage basis. Furthermore, some Indian youthas, as mentioned above, have begun to initiate relationships with Tibetan families wherein they live with the Tibetans, receiving room and board in return for which they do odd jobs around the house. For the beggars, Mundakuppe has become a gold mine and is regularly plied by many of them.

In addition to the merchants and the poor, the wealthy landowners have also benefited financially from the settlement. The DLG has consciously attempted to alleviate the natural jealousy resulting from the Tibetans' possession of tractors and trucks by making the tractors available on a rental basis to the Indian landowners. Many Indians have availed themselves of this by hiring the tractors and drivers directly. Others have leased sections of unused land to the Tibetan cooperative, a practice very advantageous because there is no danger of the tenant not relinquishing the land.

There is no question, then, but that the general area around Mundakuppe has prospered as a result of the Tibetan settlement. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that in 1970-1971 a new settlement of four thousand Tibetans was started contiguous to Mundakuppe. Even more recently, several thousand monks have been resettled from Assam to an area also adjacent to Mundakuppe. In all, there are about ten thousand Tibetans living in that area. In Mysore as a whole, there are about seventeen thousand Tibetans.

The lack of ethnic hostility and conflict between Tibetans and Indians must be seen as a consequence of both the artificial restriction of resource competition and the general economic benefits, which the presence and success of the refugees has yielded for local Indians.

CONCLUSION

I have illustrated some of the main aspects of the initial process of adaptation of Tibetans in Mundakuppe, in particular, and India, in general. In the initial decade of residence in India the Tibetans, with the help of the GOI, the state governments, and the foreign sectors, have made tremendous adjustments to the new social and physical environment they encountered. Underlying the success of this adjustment has been the continuity of many traditional Tibetan sociocultural institutions, in particular, the governmental structure headed by the Dalai Lama. Although there have been many changes in the DLG in India with respect to recruitment, authority, and power, its fundamental traditional "legitimate political authority" has been continued. The DLG offered the disparate Tibetan refugees tremendous competitive advantages, particularly in the early years of settlement. What has been surprising, however, is the DLG's ability to maintain its superordinate position. I have tried to indicate some of the basic strategies the DLG has employed to accomplish this. I have also tried to show how basic political requirements have led the DLG to direct the process of adjustment in a direction emphasizing ethnic identity and integrity and how this has resulted in the pluralistic, cultural-separatist nature of the Tibetan adaptation in India.

It is difficult, however, to speak of the adaptation of Tibetans in India, for the concept of adaptation implies a dynamic process. As John Bennett (1969: 18) has written: "Adaptation is conceived as a process of potential adjustment to existing and changing conditions." With respect to the Tibetans, a number of changing circumstances ("inputs") have already (or will) set into motion important new responses. Although these will be better dealt with in a separate paper, it would be misleading to conclude without giving some indication of the nature of these new factors.

The new inputs are basically threefold. First, there is the question of the long-term economic stability of the settlement. Second, there is a pattern
of the DLG being decreasingly able to aggregate resources and thus directly benefit the settlers economically. And third, the settlers themselves are becoming increasingly confident of their ability to exist alone in the Indian context, and therefore they are increasingly less apprehensive of undertaking independent courses of action.

One important dimension of the economic circumstances of Mundakuppe is the beginning of a disparity between output and population. Because of good medical care, the death rate has been dramatically reduced over what it would have been in Tibet. Since birth control is not used in the settlement (the DLG vigorously opposes it), there has been a steady population increase. However, the amount of land available is fixed. Thus, as the population increases, the surplus margin produced by the land will decrease, given the same level of productive output. Moreover, there is no likelihood that production will increase. Chemical fertilizers and insecticides are already in use and, as the land may be over-worked, the output may even decrease. Given the nature of land tenure described above, it is also certain that settlers will not invest private capital to improve their land and generate higher output. Consequently, unless there is some form of out-migration of excess population or unless other, nonagricultural economic sources of income are developed, the long term future of Mundakuppe faces serious difficulties.

As to economic alternatives, although the "farming only" policy limits one obvious type of alternative, a number of settlers have taken to peddling woolen sweaters throughout India in the agricultural off-season. Tibetans, in fact, have become famous for this type of trading. How long the "farming only" policy can be maintained is another matter, and, even more seriously, what will happen to Indo-Tibetan relations when it ends, is at present imponderable.

Out-migration, on the other hand, is not a very likely alternative. Employment opportunities for Tibetans are very limited. However, more recently a new factor has emerged which may have an important impact. The creation, contiguous to Mundakuppe, of a large settlement of 3000 monks, all from Drepung monastery, has opened a potential population-absorbing channel. The monks will be able to work their land communally and thus will make maximally efficient use of the mechanization available to them. Their yield per capita will be considerably higher than that of individual families with their few acres. Consequently, they will be able to support numbers well in excess of the one person per acre ratio of the lay settlers. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to expect that the monastic units will also obtain income by taking up their traditional money-lending activities. They also will undoubtedly receive extensive gifts from

the lay settlers. The significance of this for population distribution lies in the traditional Tibetan custom of giving children as monks to the monasteries and the monastery taking care of their sustenance. I expect that this traditional pattern will reemerge and become an important channel for population redistribution.

If these are some poignant future problems, the present also has produced important changes. Prime among these is the decreasing ability of the DLG to obtain foreign funds. Increasingly, the DLG is becoming dependent upon the voluntary "taxes" that the refugees (in India and abroad) have been paying. It has had to cut back much of the fat from the elaborate bureaucratic network it had developed in the earlier years. Thus, there are a growing number of young educated Tibetans who would have become DLG officials five years ago but who today have to find their own livelihood or otherwise to farm land in the settlements. This growing inability of the DLG to provide high status employment for the youth they have carefully reared and molded is beginning to weaken its position.

The best indication of this is the growing emergence (or better, reemergence) of political opposition groups. In recent years, associations and clubs from traditionally hostile regional and subcultural segments have begun to take a more active and open part in intra-Tibetan political competition. In some instances these groups have pursued actions independent of the Tibetan "national" framework. Among the young, there also has been an increase in independent thought and speech, including open criticism of governmental actions. In Mundakuppe, for example, there are those who would like to see the DLG appointed camp leader replaced by an elected settler. While, on the whole, the DLG’s vigorous policy of developing a national identity and spirit have been successful, it obviously has not eradicated traditional particularistic affiliations.

In conclusion, the situation among Tibetan refugees in India is far from settled. In the next decade, these populations will be confronted by very serious economic and political problems. Whether their initial emphasis on a cultural-pluralistic or ethnic strategy will prove workable in the long run is problematic. For the present, such a strategy has greatly facilitated the resettlement and rehabilitation of large numbers of Tibetans in an alien cultural milieu. However, its success thus far has depended upon a very delicate balance of institutional processes that have served to regulate intra- and interethnic relationships in respect to the competition for limited environmental resources.
REFERENCES

BENNETT, JOHN W.
GOLDSTEIN, MELVYN C.

GOODENOUGH, W.
WYLIE, T. V.