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COGNITIVE POETICS AND IMAGERY

Imagery is manifestly a basic and omnipresent constituent of the mental life of human beings, a cognitive prerequisite of symbolisation and thought. The study of the poetic functions of imagery offers us a window into the cognitive semantics of the imaginative mind, but the literary contribution should not limit itself to illustrating the generalities of the mind; it should also address the issue of literature as such: what compelled humans to create art, poetry, and fiction, and in which sense can we be said to have a ‘literary mind’? (cf. Turner 1996)

Imagery is a universally central dimension in poetic meaning production. Yet, cognitive poetics has made little effort so far to elucidate its semantic and semiotic mechanisms. Important as it is, imagery appears to constitute an issue exempt from deeper inquiry not only by the inherent difficulties and complexities of iconic structure but also by uncomfortable feelings about the entire field of mental representations in behavioral psychology, analytic philosophy of mind, and anti-phenomenological thinking in general. In order to develop the study of poetic imagery in the framework of a cognitive semantics and semiotics, we suggest interrelating plain literary reading and cognitive research as directly as possible, and thus openly focusing on and exploring meaning production as it occurs in the poetic text, rather than using poetry only to illustrate certain notions in cognitive semantics.

Here, we will limit ourselves to analysing two cases of reprocessed imagery, followed by some overall theoretical considerations on cognitive literary studies.

Keywords cognitive poetics; imagery; representation; simile; metaphor; mental spaces; blending; schemata; relevance

Reprocessing an idiom

The American poet Edna St Vincent Millay’s short text ‘First Fig’ reads:

My candle burns at both ends;
It will not last the night;
But ah, my foes, and oh, my friends –
It gives a lovely light!
To 'burn one’s candle at both ends' is a well-known saying, an idiomatic metaphoric clause referring to a particular lifestyle, reprehending the 'burner' for conducting his life in an immoderate way. The metaphor has an underlying concept – LIFE/DEATH IS LIGHT/DARKNESS – but the conceptual metaphor does not account for the possibilities of phrasing and developing meaning offered by the metaphoric expression itself: the candle burns and gives light; a candle cannot burn at both ends at the same time, so the idiom presents an impossible scenario, apparently as a hyperbolic means of expressing the admonition Do not do that! by saying something equivalent to It is not possible to do that. In terms of mental space theory, the metaphoric idiom has a source space presenting a candle scenario, and it has a target space referring to someone’s way of living, here the first person of the poem. The expression my candle then sets up a blended space in which not only life is a candle (cf. Shakespeare’s ‘Out, out, brief candle!’ Macbeth, V. v. 23), but a life conducted immoderately is a candle burning at both ends. The impossible is imagined in the blend, where immoderation from the life input is blended with the candle input, yielding an immoderately burning candle.

Of course, the candle metaphor only works if the cognizing minds using it understand this double combustion as implying a halving of burning time. Therefore, if you live and enjoy life immoderately, you will die sooner than you would otherwise, maybe halfway through your life, which is inadvisable.

This metaphoric idiom is entirely commonplace. The corresponding mental space network can be rendered by Figure 1.1

The text of the poem reprocesses this commonplace meaning construction. But, its enunciator adds, forming a concessive argument: although this is known and accepted, it is nevertheless better to double-burn the candle – in the context of foes and friends – for a new reason. Double consumption of energy yields double effect in these respects, so foes will be more forcefully attacked, and friends will be more intensely delighted, although for a shorter time.

The network of mental spaces already set up and made available by the speaker’s knowledge of the metaphoric idiom is reused or ‘recycled’: while maintaining the blended imagery, a new relevance-making schema is activated. In this second cycle, the spending becomes ‘increasing’, emphatically and emotionally (ah, oh), the sense of living and enjoying the lovely things of life. The attitude of self-consumption (burning yourself as a candle lit at both ends) is given as the content of an existential statement. The corresponding network may look as in Figure 2.

There is thus an argument and then a counter-argument. The latter wins, but not without making a concession: passion must be paid for. The second turn does not entirely erase the first turn.

This phenomenon of reprocessing a pre-existing semantic construction makes it possible to embed a personalized enunciation (My candle ...) in an impersonal idiom. We will study another example of it here; the reprocessing principle may in fact turn out to be an essential characteristic of poetry at large, and perhaps an essential aspect of aesthetic meaning production as such. But since we are committed to studying poetic art here, we need to understand its textual conditions more thoroughly.
Structural stratification

Texts are linguistic and semiotic wholes that are organised as layered, stratified entities. There is a first stratum of grammatical structure –

My candle SUBJECT burns VERB at both ends ADVERBIAL, and so forth.

– which in its semantic aspect comprises a structure of enunciation, specifying a first person, a second person, and a mode, or ‘genre’, of presentation of the content, for example, irony, humour, emotional tone and temperature, and evidentiality (the indicated source of knowledge implied or expressed in discourse, namely, the epistemic grounding of assertions, for example, experience, inference or hearsay). Secondly, there is a stratum of semantic content, the sort of imaginal structure (imaginal: belonging to imagination) we have seen above, and which feeds back into the pragmatic space of actual communication. Thirdly, the literary reading inserts this structure (the content) into a pattern of formal composition: verses, stanzas, and so forth – thus, the defiant rhyme of ‘last the night’ and ‘lovely light’ (lines 2 and 4) is of literary importance, since it underscores, as a quasi-oxymoron, the frontal opposition of the implied schemas. Finally, there is a stratum of interpretation, involving the aesthetic evaluation of the entire text as a poem, taken in the context of its genre. These four
strata are, we think, universally present in literary meaning, that is, they are ontologically given parts of what we experience as a literary text:

(1) Language (grammatical structure) and enunciation.
(2) Semantic content of the text, including imagery and narrativity.
(3) Compositional form, including phonetics, graphics, and so forth.
(4) Interpretive aesthetic status in the framework of a genre.

Description and evaluation of literary texts by default include observations referring to these interconnected levels of meaningful structure.

Recycling the network

As our second example, we will consider William Shakespeare's 'Sonnet 147' (quoted from Wells, 1985: 161):

My love is as a fever, longing still
For that which longer nurseth the disease,
Feeding on that which doth preserve the ill,
Th'uncertain sickly appetite to please.
My reason, the physician to my love,
Angry that his prescriptions are not kept,
Hath left me, and I desperate now approve
Desire is death, which physic did except.
Past cure I am, now reason is past care,
And frantic mad with evermore unrest.

My thoughts and my discourse as madmen's are,
At random from the truth vainly expressed;
For I have sworn thee fair, and thought thee bright,
Who art as black as hell, as dark as night.

The starting formula is a well-known comparison (aka simile): My love is as a fever. In terms of blending theory, a network could account for the standard idea of comparing the state of being in love with the state of being ill. Since it is a comparison, it has a protasis (A is like B) and an explicative apodosis: this is so because of, or with respect to, C. Love (A) is like an illness (B), a fever—an illness leading to the rise of body temperature, in the sense that it takes control over the body and tends to extend its power still more; the owner of the body is helpless. This is a commonplace construction, often used in communication in order to express and stress the intensity of a feeling of love (see Figure 3).

In the recycling taking place in the poem, the loss of control is dramatized, and its mental aspect is ascribed to the subject of enunciation itself: the first person declares to have lost his reason. It is worth noting that in the recycled version of a network—with A mapping onto B, and C projected onto the blend of A and B—the structure is, as above, personalized by a first person presentation: My love...

The enunciational structure of this text has an explicit representation of first and second person, and its thematic setting focuses on the speaker’s mental state and the addressee’s moral value. These themes are developed through the reprocessed fever imagery.* In a succinct self-narration, which offers a four-step gradation in the mental self-portrait, the subject of its enunciation declares himself to be in love, then to be irrational, then to be even irreversibly mad, and finally to see through his madness and right into the dark truth of the beloved, paradoxically stated in a clear and rational, self-critical discourse of the kind he has declared himself to have lost; or else this truth of the addressee has to be attributed to the madman. The undecidability of the truth value of the final distich is part of the artistry of this sonnet.

The story of the angry physician and the desperate patient is clearly distinct from the default fever comparison. In terms of form (stratum 3 of the textual architecture, above), the transition from the first processing of the network to a second turn takes place between the first and the second quartet. So in line 5, by way of metaphor, my reason, the antagonist of my love, in the Reference space of the network, is imagined, in the Presentation space, as a person, a physician (an antagonist to the fever); and an allegorical drama is sketched out: since the patient refuses to follow the prescriptions of the physician, the latter gets angry and leaves the former helpless, in despair and agony. In the Reference, the subject loses his reason and becomes frantic mad.
'Mad' is of course an ambiguous term, since it can denote either a psychopathological condition or a simple emotional state. If there is a 'madness' blend in this reprocessed construction, then its relevance could be the new schematic scenario: 'at random from the truth', where the subject's discourse is a body moving away from a landmark called 'truth' and is going in no other specific direction (random). 'Erring' could be what the cognizer's language and thought is finally doing: characterizing the beloved as *fair* and *bright*, while knowing she is *black*, *dark*, presumably in some moral respect: the latter predicates 'err' at random from the former, and the enunciator paradoxically knows the position of both.

The message to be fed back into the Base space of the network is one of alarm, maybe in the sense that since the subject is in a critical state, the addressee should perhaps mobilize her *ethical* schema and help him, now that the physician has given up.5 This would then be a prominent part of the Relevance space of the new network, an underlying, implicit illocutionary relevance ('I love you, please help me!'): see Figure 4.

Reason stops serving the subject; the subject suffers from an incurable illness, in a virtual sense, which is worsened by the passivity of his reason, resulting in madness. The enunciator is mad in the blend, yet still clear-headed in the semiotic base space. This duality allows for his madness to be clearly stated in the final distich.
Compositionally (stratum 3), it is remarkable that one imaginal idea thus receives an extensive textual unfolding which lets the source-based imagery of the simile flow through the entire poem – unlike standard sonnet imagery, which has one ‘juicy’ metaphor in each quartet, tercet, or distich.6

Aesthetically (stratum 4), it is noticeable that the theme of madness and the theatrically critical state of the subject of enunciation do not lead to a theatrical imitation of ‘mad discourse’ of any kind in the sonnet. Even though in twentieth-century poetry iconic mimicry from content to enunciation is the most common feature, there is, to our knowledge, no genre of psychotic sonnets in world literature. Instead, we feel that the clarity of exposition supports the undecidability, the paradoxical, almost ironic, unstable temperature of the voice that finally expresses the epistemic crisis of the subject, and its cry for response.

Some theoretical reflections on cognitive approaches to literature

There are of course many more dimensions of a cognitive study of poetry than the semantic and imagery-related issues analyzed in the above examples. As a general
‘human science’ perspective on literature, cognitive poetics should encompass not only poetry but also prose, drama and any hybrid genres, or ‘modes’ of writing. For this reason perhaps ‘cognitive literary studies’ is a more apt term for the enterprise, as suggested by the title of the present issue. Alternatively, cognitive poetics could be viewed as a specialized branch within cognitive literary studies, dealing specifically with analyses of poems. However, it seems sensible to include in our notion of ‘poetics’ all literary forms of writing, in the spirit of the etymological root of the word (thus, the Greek word poiesis, creation, refers to all creative uses of language). Adopting this latter view, the term ‘cognitive poetics’ refers to cognitively-oriented generalizations on creative (read: literary) writing as such and can be used interchangeably with ‘cognitive literary studies’ to indicate the study of literary creations in a cognitive perspective.

Two dimensions can be outlined within the emerging field of cognitive poetics: textual analysis and cognitive aesthetics. The insight gained from the body of cognitive readings can be exploited in developing a poetics—a cognitive poetics—in the sense of a cognitively-motivated literary rhetoric: guidelines for linguistic and compositional cause and effect, to the benefit not only of scholars, but of writers as well. From the perspective of the writer such a literary rhetoric amounts to the art of achieving the desired literary effect, and from the perspective of the scholarly reader, to the art of recognizing the cognitive and semiotic causes of the experienced effects of a reading.

The gradual crystallisation of such useful generalizations may open up a new direction for literary criticism, building on what is known about how memory works, perception of time in a reading, the relationship between represented time and the time of narration, voice and representation of viewpoints, categorization, event structure, and all such things pertaining to how we build representations—namely, knowledge about general human faculties and about cognition of linear organization of linguistic artefacts in particular (in other words: literary cognition). The development of a literary cognitive aesthetics is a potential future project in cognitive poetics—just as studies in perception are now branching out to include a cognitive aesthetics for visual art.

Dimensions of textual analysis comprise three distinct cognitive activities: reading, interpretation, and aesthetic evaluation. These three dimensions may not all be present in a given analysis. However, a reading, under any view, must be taken as the minimal requirement of what can be called a textual analysis, and a reading in turn can generate an interpretation and/or an evaluation of the text as a work of art. In addition to these three dimensions, we might add comparative approaches: comparative studies of singular phenomena across a range of singular uses, and across a range of different texts; the phenomenon of negation, for instance, or irony, or some other particular conceptual phenomenon expressed in its varied forms in one or several different texts.

Since linguistic expressions are seen as manifestations of—relatively stable—conceptual content governed by cognitive mechanisms that can be studied—experimentally and introspectively?—the cognitive approach to literature takes an interest, not only in literature but also in language as such. Literary texts are seen as an immense resource: empirical manifestations of language from which knowledge can be formed. Apart from exploiting texts as gold mines of empirical linguistic data, there is the added benefit that literary language use often bends and twists known
constructions and modes of expression; by deviating from the norm, the norm is exposed. This is essentially the same methodological consideration expressed by Fauconnier in his book *Mappings in Thought and Language*:

Errors, jokes, literary effects, and atypical expressions use the same cognitive operations as everyday language, but in ways that actually highlight them and can make them more salient. As data, they have a status comparable to laboratory experiments in physics: things that may not be readily observable in ordinary circumstances, which for that reason shed light on ordinary principles.

(Fauconnier, 1997: 125)

In ordinary, pragmatically oriented language use, utterances are often a means to an end. To some degree this is true for literary language use as well, in so far as the imaginations (imagined scenarios) presented are rendered by the vehicle of linguistic expressions (ignoring, for the moment, the function of *paragraph*, *white space*, *enjambment*, and other textual phenomena that are not strictly linguistic). However, the *expression* side of language (in Hjelmslev's sense) is foregrounded in literature, and in this respect literary texts offer a unique linguistic experience.

Literary language is doubly meaningful: the linguistic signs mean something on the page, in the ordinary sense and, in addition to that, they are loaded with intentionality; if they appear on the page they are *meant* to be there. Nothing is accidental, or nothing should be; recall reading experiences that leave you with the feeling that *any* hypothetical alteration would disrupt the textual integrity — every comma, every sentence is in place: exactly where it 'should' be. There is an authorial presence in the literary text that attunes the reader's attention to what is written, mirroring the authorial attention to detail and structure. The literary artefact is highly intentional, and this makes a difference for the reading experience. Literary language is uniquely meaningful and — perhaps for this reason? — uniquely enjoyable. One might even say: the more intentional a text feels the more *literary* it is.

The strong semiotic intentionality gives rise to a more sensuous and conscious language processing on the part of the reader, compared to texts that are purely message oriented, or texts that are literary but thought to have been written with a lack of sensitivity to linguistic expression and structural awareness. In this sense, literary texts invite reciprocity between the author and the reader in the amount of attention invested in the work. From the perspective of the literary reader, the author is expected to have anticipated the reading, which in a way entails the author reading his or her own text as the imagined reader would read it, that is, from the viewpoint of an anonymous 'model' reader — not an average reader, but a proficient and competent ideal reader. A text vested with heightened attention calls for a reading vested with heightened attention. The more authorial awareness is present in the text, the more worthwhile the reading of it is.

It will be news perhaps only to some philosophers that the main purpose of language is not to denote objectively existing states of affairs in the world, but it is worth mentioning, nonetheless, that language, apart from its referential function, and apart from its — increasingly recognized — expressive, social function, is a semiotic system which is experienced on an aesthetic level as well. Without denying the evident functional aspects of language, the aesthetic factor should be taken into account.
Literature foregrounds the signifying side of language (recalling Saussure’s division of the sign into a signifier and a signified) (Saussure 1916, 1995) and language as such, including the fact that language has a built-in speaker, or ‘utterer’. This enunciatory presence implies a situation of communication. It introduces a discursive element.

The implied dialogue in language allowing us, for instance, to refer deictically to ourselves and each other, using personal pronouns, is somewhat mutated in literary enunciation. The ‘you’, for instance, becomes a construct, an addressee role, that the speaking ‘I’ can address, or it is absent from the text and present only as an implied addressee. Literary enunciation, with all its peculiar possibilities, (including the paradoxically lucid and eloquent enunciation of the statement ‘my discourse as madmen’s arc’) is one aspect of textuality that belongs to the realm of writing, language as an artefact, or écrite as the French call it. Enunciation is one of the four semantic levels of a literary text, in the cognitive framework proposed by L. Brandt (2000 and 2006). The following is a brief, revised description of the structure of this framework.

The main idea is that the cognitive processes that underlie textual comprehension can be reconstructed as consisting of four contingent and dynamically interrelated levels, corresponding to four levels of analysis, as mentioned above. These four stable components make up a reading and an interpretation. The reading consists of descriptions of the semiotic structure at the first three levels: 1) enunciation; 2) semantic content; and 3) textual rhetoric. A thorough reading pays attention to the enunciational structure of a text (for example, voice and viewpoint), the semantic content (for example, the conflicts depicted in a story) and the rhetoric employed (resulting in a description of authorial ‘style’).

These levels are stable components that are related in such a way that one level becomes a prerequisite for the next one, and the result is a ‘reading’ that ‘feeds into’ an interpretation, at the fourth level. If we take a poem as an example, the poet sets up, or establishes, a voice that frames the semantic content of the poem, which in turn becomes a signified for a rhetorical signifier, at the third level (textual rhetoric). These three levels can be subsumed as the who, the what and the how of the text.

Having analyzed the enunciation (who is speaking?), the semantic content (what is the text about?) and the rhetoric (how is the semantic content presented linguistically and compositionally?), the analyst is left with the question of why. This is the interpretational level. The reading of the text becomes a signifier for some life-world phenomenon that can be identified as the model author intention. Why is the text written as it is? What does it mean?

The textual interpretation follows the reading. This theoretical notion also entails that one should suspend any interpretive conclusions until the reading is completed. One must understand the text before one can decide on possible meanings. A literary interpretation is a generalization from the text to the intersubjective life-world of human beings, advocating or exposing aspects of it, a generalization that is motivated and supported by the reading. The most plausible interpretations are the ones that have the most support in the text, that is, whose claims are supported by the enunciational structure, the semantic content, and the rhetoric of the text, established in the reading. A plausible interpretation addresses all main issues in a text and encompasses as many themes and motifs as possible, creating coherence, without
ignoring relevant elements or letting them go unexplained. If authorial intentionality is assumed as a guiding literary notion in the analysis, then any contradictions or ambiguities should be treated as meaningful within the coherent whole.

Textual interpretations are relevant from a literary perspective, of course, but they may also be relevant for the generation of ideas within the cognitive sciences that are not literally oriented. Insight from literary studies can cast light on interesting aspects of human existence and aid in the formulation of hypotheses to be investigated further within the human sciences or tested within experimental psychology, for instance. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that literary depictions of human cognition and behavior are more true to nature than the descriptions one might obtain by other methods. This generalization concerns the problem of obtaining valid data, which can perhaps be illustrated by an example from biology: if one were to gauge the statistical frequency of female infidelity and one conducted interviews with female parents, on the one hand, and did genetic testing of the offspring and the alleged fathers, on the other, one is more than likely to end up with confounding inconsistencies between the two sets of findings. There are various reasons why humans may not give accurate descriptions of their thought processes and behavioral patterns. These reasons are present to a much lesser degree in literary representations of human life. There is a candour, an unobstructed matter-of-factness to descriptions of humans in literature that is hard to find anywhere else. Literature, for this reason, is a great resource to be mined by cognitive science.

It is of course not all interpretations that yield useful insights to the human mind. Textual interpretations are potentially relevant for cognitive science in so far as the target text exposes cognitive and behavioural tendencies in human beings, and the interpretations focus on these rather than on features of a socio-historical nature. This perspective, which we claim is inherent to the project of establishing a solid theoretical foundation for cognitive literary studies, entails a trans-historical view of literature. A Toni Morrison story of slavery can thus not only be about an African-American realm of experience, to take an example. Literary interpretations, in this view, must aim at a level of abstraction that transcends the historical particulars. We could call this kind of interpretation existential; the text instantiates some general aspect of being human, of the human condition. The text, at the level of interpretation, signifies eternal matters of human existence.

Taking a cognitive turn in literary studies has certain philosophical implications that should be acknowledged. Cognitive readings do not necessarily exclude awareness of and reflection on the historical specifics of a text, and existential interpretations can build on abstractions from particulars at an intermediary — historically specific — level. In a fiction, for instance, the intermediary level between seeing characters, with proper names and specific characteristics, and seeing human beings, would be the level at which these individuals are seen as 'African-Americans' or 'French nineteenth-century urbanites', or whatever they happen to be. However, the study of cognition cannot be the study of African-American cognition, or French nineteenth-century cognition. It obviously has to be the study of human cognition.

The underlying belief, then, is that there is a 'cognition' to study: that minds really do cognize in similar ways. One of the cognitive feats of humans is the ability to create and share representations and to create artefacts out of these representations. It is thus a basic belief in cognitive poetics that there are stable textual meanings and that
these meanings can be shared. This representational stability is grounded in cognition, which has probably not changed much for the past 50,000 years.

A cognitive reading of a text has a double scope. The reader’s attention is focused not only on understanding the text but also on the process of creating the representations that make up the text. Apart from reading and interpreting the text, the reader forms hypotheses as to how the meanings are arrived at. A cognitive-poetic reading is necessarily text-oriented, rather than biographically oriented. Or rather, it is text-mind-oriented, since minds are making sense of the linguistic artefact that is the text, and coming up with possible meanings.

Cognitive readings apply tools developed in cognitive science, though of course not exclusively. We would also strongly emphasize developments in narrative semiotics, Russian formalism, and other traditions in literary criticism.

One example is the (yet incomplete) diagramming of the cognitive inventory of abstract schemata, also sometimes referred to as image schemas or force-dynamic schemas, which are a resource from cognitive linguistics (developed further in the Aarhus school of cognitive semiotics), which proves a source of insight when applied in the analysis of narrative structure.

Another example is provided by systematic descriptions of cognitive phenomena within the realm of cognitive semantics, which also play an important role in literary texts, such as metaphor, counterfactuals, hypotheticals, negation, analogy, and other expressive events, which are analyzed in terms of blends of mental spaces.

Cognitive readings also go in the other direction: from phenomena encountered in the text to hypotheses about the general characteristics of these phenomena in cognition. That is, readings also give rise to generalizations about the cognitive phenomena displayed in the texts, such as categorization, concept formation, schemas, frames, mental space structure, temporal structure, viewpoint structure, enunciational structure, blends, and so forth.

One thing that cognitive approaches to the study of literature add to the already established fields in literary theory is a new focus on the shared mental processes involved in and artistically expressed in literary language use, since these linguistic artefacts are created out of general cognitive capacities, by- and for-communicating and meaning-generating humans.

Theoretical constructs derived from cognitive linguistics, cognitive semiotics and other branches of cognitive science supply the literary scholar with useful analytic tools, at the local as well as at the global levels of textual analysis. However, the exchange goes in the other direction as well, from literary studies to cognitive science. Research in human emotion could benefit from exploring descriptions of emotive human behavior in literary representations of life, for one. And cognitive literary studies could shed light on general cognitive mechanisms exploited for artistic purposes in literary texts. Thus, actual language use, as we encounter it in literature, provides data for specific studies of particular linguistic phenomena as well as an empirical basis for generalizations on language and mind to be applied in theoretical linguistics.

The analyses presented here intend to show how ‘creative’ and ‘trivial’ entrenched constructions interact and constitute interconnected aspects of a general human semantic processing that basically follow the same structuring principles and use the same schemas and networks whether they appear in poems or in common
phrasology – the privilege of poetic cognition is that it highlights intentional meaning, that it lets us produce or find Beauty, to paraphrase Keats’s famous lines, it lets us gain insight about the Truths of meaning construction.

Notes

1 Edna St Vincent Millay (1892–1950); the poem is from *A Few Figs from Thistles* (1920). The authors quote from Pockell (2001: 151).
2 The network of mental spaces and its principles are explained in detail in Brandt and Brandt (2005). Other blending-based analyses of poetic imagery can be found in ‘Metaphors and Meaning in Shakespeare’s “Sonnet 73”’ and ‘Poetry, Cognitive Semiotics, and Baudelaire’s “Cats”’, both articles in Brandt (2004: 141–158, 159–166).
4 Texts equipped with prominent figurative imagery are often experienced as referring to an emphatically salient pragmatic state of affairs. This sonnet could be an example; the poem could well have been written as a real love letter, or a non-fictional declaration of some corresponding sort.
5 Cf. the ethical schema discussed in Brandt and Brandt (2005).
6 Stanzas are very often the expressive ‘containers’ of distinct imaginal constructions, as shown in ‘Metaphors and Meaning in Shakespeare’s “Sonnet 73”’ and ‘Poetry, Cognitive Semiotics, and Baudelaire’s “Cats”’, both articles in Brandt (2004: 141–158, 159–166).
7 Introspection should include the observation of *shared* meaning, intersubjectively experienced meaning – the phenomenology of communicating by what we might call ‘interception’.
8 Following Saussure, Hjelmslev distinguished between the expression and the content of a sign, on the one hand, and the form and the substance on the other. The result is a quadruple semiotic division into expression form and expression substance, and between content form and content substance. To read Hjelmslev in English translation, see for instance Hjelmslev 1961.
9 Intended here as including references to absent, fictive, hypothetical and counterfactual realities.

References


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