Footnotes
1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 - 11 - 12 - 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18 - 19 - 20 - 21 - 22 - 23 - 24 - 25 - 26 - 27 - 28 - 29 - 30 - 31 - 32 - 33 - 34 - 35 - 36 - 37 - 38 - 39 - 40
1
See Martha Woodmansee, "The Genius and the Copyright:
Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the 'Author'";
reprinted in Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the Market,
35-55.
[return to top]
2
In "Toward a Theory of Copyright: the Metamorphosis
of Authorship," Peter Jaszi offers an explanation of
the evolution of copyright law in terms of the Romantic theory
of authorship, and demonstrates the incoherence of modern
copyright doctrine. In order to do this, he analyzes two major
constructions that the law appropriated from mid-eighteenth-century
literary theory in order to ground the privileges granted
by copyright. The first of these is the concept of author
as one who independently and by force of genius (or later
creativity) creates a totally new cultural production and
deserves to have his genius and/or labor protected. This protection
of genius and labor forms the initial rationalization for
copyright laws, but as the various industries became more
involved in copyright cases, it became necessary to separate
the "creative individual" and the cultural production
attributed to him, and thus was born the second concept, the
work. These two concepts have been generally assumed to be
"natural" by the law, and thus beyond critique,
but as Jaszi shows in his essay, they are not immediately
obvious concepts and serve to create a confused and incoherent
copyright doctrine.
According to Jaszi, the notion of author began in early England
(around the time of Chaucer), and came into more common use
in the seventeenth century. It was initially a distinction
taken up by writers to denote themselves as masters of the
craft and "to distinguish themselves from common writers,
and to ground claims of prerogative with respect to bodies
of literary production" (469). Being and author implied
that one was a superior craftsman, not that one was particularly
original. When the English government sought to create laws
to prevent the "pirating" of new books after their
first publication, the problem of deciding how to give out
property rights in the content of new books was resolved in
the Statute of Anne (1709) by investing that right in the
author of the work, who would then sell his right to a publisher.
While the concept of "authorship" had not taken
on its full ideological significance by 1710 when it was introduced
into English law, it expanded and eventually "the term
took on a life of its own as individualistic notions of creativity,
originality, and inspiration [from the Enlightenment and Romanticism]
were poured into it" (471). This led to a shift in the
policy conflict of copyright law from one of publishers versus
pirates to "one between the interests of 'authors' and
those of 'users'" (471). The law courts, however, read
early copyright narrowly, only protecting the author against
the unauthorized verbatim reproduction of a text. This combined
with the instability of the "authorship" construct
itself lead to the development of the work concept in the
legal discourse, making a "free-standing abstraction"
into "the subject of literary property" rather than
the author himself (473).
Turning to Marxist terminology, Jaszi observes that the work
concept represents the commodification and objectification
of the writer's labor. This develops into so important a concept
that courts began to see the nature of the work rather than
the writer's labor as the deciding factor regarding the copyrightability
of the text. This leads to the alienation of the writer from
his labor, and eventually feeds into a divergent jurisprudence.
In the 1884 case of Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,
the U.S. Supreme Court "emphasized the 'author,' with
only a general reference to the work" (482). However,
by 1903, the Court came to view the work as essential, as
shown in the Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. case
where "the Court played down the significance of the
creator's input: even the humblest creative input is ordinarily
protected" (483). This fundamental tension between the
emphasis on the author and the emphasis on the work manifests
itself throughout the various copyright cases after Bleistein,
giving rise to a copyright doctrine plagued by an incoherence
that is difficult to explain in terms of any underlying ideological
structure. In this discourse, the Romantic author can be either
central or peripheral, depending upon the judge and case (500).
Ultimately, the conflict in copyright doctrine has changed
from "opposition between ownership and access" to
one between "the collectivism of the market," where
the work is central because of the desire to keep new and
better "works" entering the market, and "the
prerogatives of the autonomous individual," where the
right of the author to absolute control over his text is the
motivating force. Thus, according to Jaszi, copyright law
is in an inexorable contradiction because of the opposition
of Romantic "authorship" and pre-Romantic "collectivity."
Jaszi, Peter. "Toward a Theory of Copyright: the Metamorphosis
of Authorship." Duke Law Journal 45.5 (1991) : 455-502.
[return to top]
3
See Christine MacLeod, "Concepts of Invention and the
Patent Controversy in Victorian Britain." MacLeod quotes
Isambard Brunel's succinct expression of this view in his
1851 memoirs: "I believe that the most useful and novel
inventions and improvements of the present day are mere progressive
steps in a highly wrought and highly advanced system, suggested
by, and dependent on, other previous steps, their whole value
and the means of their application probably dependent on the
success of some or many other inventions, some old, some new.
I think also that really good improvements are not the result
of inspiration; they are not, strictly speaking, inventions,
but more or less the results of an observing mind, brought
to bear upon circumstances as they arise, with an intimate
knowledge of what already has been done, or what might now
be done, by means of the present improved state of things,
and that in most cases they result from a demand which circumstances
happen to create" (147). See also Edith Tilton Penrose,
The Economics of the International Patent System, esp.
19-41.
For More Information on Early Patent.
[return to top]
4
MacLeod, "Concepts of Invention," esp. 150-53.
See also MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution,
esp. chaps. 10 and 11.
For More Information on Early Patent.
[return to top]
5
On this episode, see Nell Jessup Newton, "Memory and
Misrepresentation"; Peter Jaszi and Martha Woodmansee,
"The Ethical Reaches of Authorship," esp. 961-63;
Rosemary Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties,
199-207.
[return to top]
6
The venerable age of the medicine wheel,which contributes
so much to its cultural value, also weighs against its elibibility
for meaningful protection because many of the rights awarded
to creators under intellectual property law are limited in
duration -- economic rights under copyright, for example, endure
for the lifetime of an author plus 70 years.
[return to top]
7
On the differences between science and lore, see Arun Agrawal,
"Dismantling the Divide between Indigenous and Scientific
Knowledge."
[return to top]
8
These are the figures of Manuel F. Balandrin et al, "Natural
Plant Chemicals," 1157.
[return to top]
9
See Steven R. King, "The Source of Our Cures,"
19.
[return to top]
10
See Edward O. Wilson, "Threats to Biodiversity,"
116.
[return to top]
11
Ironically, the information about the properties of the
rosy periwinkle that first drew Eli Lilly's researchers to
Madagascar did not even come from the indigenous knowledge
base of that society. As it turns out, the investigation of
the periwinkle began because Filipino and Jamaican folklore
suggested that a tea brewed from its leaves could be a remedy
for diabetes (see Karen Ann Goldman, "Compensation for
Use of Biological Resources," 717 n. 131). If anyone
deserves compensation for appropriated bioknowledge in the
case of the periwinkle, then it is perhaps the Filipino and
Jamaican communities in which this folklore was preserved
rather than the people of Madagascar.
[return to top]
12
See Anne Jeanblanc, "Fighting Cancer on Many Fronts,"
42-43. In addition to this article, see discussion in volume
12 of the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment
Law Journal in the spring of 2002 on page 753. The symposium
panelists Blakeney, Lourie, Salmon and Visser, all well regarded
experts in their field, discuss the role of law and policy
in protecting traditional folklore, traditional knowledge
and genetic resources in great depth and from varying angles.
[return to top]
13
WIPO, "1967, 1982, 1984," 5.
[return to top]
14
On the Model Provisions and their limitations, see Christine
Farley, "Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples,"
44-46. The history of the Model Provisions is addressed, among
other topics, by contributors to Peter Seitel, ed., Safeguarding
Traditional Cultures: A Global Assessment, the proceedings
of a conference convened in connection with the ten-year review
of the 1989 UNESCO "Recommendation on the Safeguarding
of Traditional Culture and Folklore." Another useful
recent status review is the WIPO's Intellectual Property
Needs and Expectations of Traditional Knowledge Holders,
based on a series of regional conferences and fact-finding
missions.
[return to top]
15
Darel A. Posey and Grant Dutfield report that "a number
of African countries, such as Nigeria, have enacted legislation
based, at least in part, on the Model Provisions" but
do not give specifics (Beyond Intellectual Property,
100).
[return to top]
16
Article 27(2), which permits states to make limited exclusions
from patentability, applies only to inventions that would,
if commercialized, threaten public order or morality. The
only concessions to less-developed countries on this issue
are those found in Articles 65 and 66, which allow such countries
four to ten years (depending on their stage of development)
to phase in TRIPS-compliant domestic legislation.
[return to top]
17
Although originally intended to apply to new plant varieties
resulting from human manipulation of biological materials,
this provision could be viewed as an invitation to enact national
laws of a more comprehensive character, applicable to naturally
occurring species as well. The problem is that under TRIPS
the object of such protection would be plant varieties themselves,
and not human knowledge concerning their properties. For more
information, see discussion in volume 22 of the Hastings International
and Comparative Law Review in 1999 on page 777 regarding the
protection of intellectual property and its relationship to
plant genetic resources. Using India as a case study, Meetali
Jain confronts the issues from the standpoints of equity,
justice, and ethics.
[return to top]
18
Mongane Wally Serote, "One Fundamental Threshold,"
3.
[return to top]
19
Genetic Resources Action International.
[return to top]
20
See esp. Graham Dutfield's 1,400-entry Annotated Bibliography.
See also Tom Greaves, ed., Intellectual Property Rights
for Indigenous Peoples; Miges Baumann et al., eds., The
Life Industry; and Darel Posey and Graham Dutfield, Beyond
Intellectual Property. For an analysis of the effect of
patent protection on both developed and developing nations
see volume 7 of the Widener Law Symposium of 2001 page 203.
See also discussion in volume 14 St. Thomas Law Review in
the winter of 2001 at page 287. In the sixth annual Tribal
Sovereignty Symposium Miriam Latorre Quinn presents a general
overview of the debate regarding intellectual property and
indigenous peoples through the lens of international law.
For further information, see discussion in volume 2 of the
Minnesota Intellectual Property Review on page 1 of 2001.
Ragavan, head of the center for Intellectual Property Rights
Advocacy at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore,
argues that the international debate over intellectual property
rights will spur the creation of strong IP systems in many
developing nations. However, focusing on Western conventions
may ultimately be counter productive.
For a hypothesis on the ethos at the heart of this problematic,
see volume 23 of the Northwestern School of Law Journal of
International Law & Business in the Spring of 2003 at
page 589. Shubna Ghosh, Professor of law at the University
of Buffalo Law School, argues that the heart of the clash
over intellectual property rights is actually a clash of civilizations.
The North-South conflict manifests itself in cultural variations
and traditions. The question of whether or not an artifact
of traditional knowledge should be owned, and who the owner
should be, is central to his discussion.
[return to top]
21
Erica-Irene Daes, "Discrimiation Against Indigenous
Peoples," 29.
[return to top]
22
Hong Yongping, "The Experience of Asia and the Pacific
Region."
[return to top]
23
Barlow enlists Thomas Jefferson in defense of his cause,
quoting Jefferson's characterization of information as by
nature a public good: "If nature has made any one thing
less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it
is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which
an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps
it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself
into the possession of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess
himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one
possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole
of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction
hemself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper
at mine, receives light without darkening me" ("The
Economy of Ideas," 85).
[return to top]
24
Ibid., 86.
[return to top]
25
Vandana Shiva, Biopiracy, 45. See Footnote 17 in addition
to volume 4 of the Yale Human Rights & Development Law
Journal in 2001 at page 63. Chetan Gulati characterizes bio-piracy
as a tragedy of the commons and calls for the creation of
a new international regime to specifically address the issues
relating to intellectual property and plant genetic resources.
Also note the discussion in volume 13 of the Albany Law Journal
of Science and Technology in 2002 on page 123. Michael Woods
presents a well-documented case study regarding the bio-piracy
of the jasmine rice seed.
[return to top]
26
As quoted by John F. Burns, "Tradition in India vs.
a Patent in the U.S." See also Michael D. Lemonick, "Seeds
of Conflict"; and Richard H. Kjeldgaard and David R.
Marsh, "Claims Upon Nature."
[return to top]
27
John Cohrssen and David McIntosh, "Major Problems with
the Draft Convention on Biological Diversity." The Convention on Biological Diversity aspires to "conservation, sustainable use, [and] equitable benefit sharing." The Convention's more recent innovations, including their "Strategic Plan" for implementing these goals, are available at www.biodiv.org/sp . While obstacles to fulfillment of the Convention's goals are plentiful, progress has been occurring since the founding of the Convention in 1992. Recently, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, a treaty focused on international trade and use of "any living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology," has advanced the aims of the Convention by making countries aware of Biodiversity issues and ensuring that countries have the resources and technology in order to participate in the treaty.
[return to top]
28
The resurrection of this old idea is generally credited to
Garrett Hardin's 1968 article on population ecology, "The
Tragedy of the Commons."
[return to top]
29
See esp. E.P.Thompson, Customs in Common, 107.
[return to top]
30
Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic
Civil Society," 319.
[return to top]
31
See Peter Jaszi's discussion in "Goodbye to All That,
" 611.
[return to top]
32
Claudia Curuthers, "International Cultural Property,"
esp. 167-69.
[return to top]
33
Joseph Henry Vogel, Privatisation as a Conservation Policy,
123.
[return to top]
34
The disciplinary roots of copyright are explored in Carla
Hesse, "Enlightenment Epistemology." The same impulse
to discipline by assigning responsibility for texts is explored
by Mario Biagioli with regard to the conventions of attribution
in contemporary science ("The Instability of Authorship").
[return to top]
35
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our
Common Future , 46. See David Hunter et al., International
Environmental Law , esp. chap. 3.
See a summary of the Bruntland Report, also known as Our Common Future.The full text of The Brundtland Report is 400 pages long, and therefore not available online. It can be purchased from Amazon here.
[return to top]
36
Under a CIR regime, local communities that were the custodians
of particular bodies of knowledge would be required to share
that knowledge with other like communities so long as it is
not sought for commercial purposes, commercial users would
be required to pay the local community (if registered) or
the state (as trustee, in lieu of such registration) as stipulated
royalty on sales, or a nonmonetary equivalent to be determined
by local custom, practice, and usage; where more than one
community is the custodian of a particular body of knowledge,
payments in connection with its commercialization would be
shared among them; and firms commercializing local knowledge
would be barred from seeking to control it through the exercise
of Western intellectual property rights such as patents. See
Gurdial Singh Nijar, In Defense of Local Community Knowledge
and Biodiversity; the draft Community Intellectual Rights
Act, and Manuela Carneiro de Cunha, "the Role of UNESCO in
Defense of Traditional Knowledge." The effect of such legislation
would be to create for traditional culture a version of a
mechanism much discussed but little implemented in connection
with conventional intellectual property law: the so-called
domaine publique payant. See Christine Farley, "Protecting
Folklore of Indigenous Peoples," 49-50.
"The Role of UNESCO in Defense of Traditional Knowledge" is available in its full text. In the article, Professor de Cunha suggests that WIPO and UNESCO are in the unique position of being able to regulate use of traditional knowledge. They must protect this knowledge with a duel goal of ensuring that its bearers earn sufficient profit from it while allowing others to benefit from this information. These aims could be accomplished, she suggests, by putting the information in the public domain; letting UNESCO protect the knowledge against piracy while allowing the holders of this knowledge to earn money from it. This concept is called the "domaine publique payant," or, loosely translated, "public domain payment."
Christine Farley, in her article entitled "Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer?" indicates several problems with the application of the current system of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) to traditional knowledge (TK) or traditional cultural expressions (TCEs). In the first section of her article, she discusses several problems with the application of current copyright law to indigenous knowledge. Specifically, Farley discusses 1.) the duration of protection on a centuries-old, yet current, art form; 2.) the "originality" standard, where folk art is valued for its conformity to tradition rather than its break from it; 3.) the requirement that the copyrighted item be in a fixed medium, while folklore is almost necessarily orally relayed; 4.) the importance of the rights of the group to which the indigenous artist belongs, and the impossibility of listing the tribe as joint authors; 4.) the impossibility of interpreting "fair use" for works derived from sacred texts or objects; and 5.) the difficulty of fairly awarding damages for these infringements.
The second section of the article describes current international efforts to cover folklore under copyright law and the modifications to copyright law which are necessary in order to make such coverage feasible. She describes the amendment, article 15(4) of the Berne Convention. Another option is the Tunis Model Law on Copyright (1976), which attempts to protect folklore as part of a national cultural heritage, making an exception to the qualification of fixation, but not retroactively applied, meaning that those elements of TK and TCE already in the public domain would remain there, rather than become the property of their traditional creators. Farley mentions the UNESCO and WIPO proposed "Model Provisions," written in 1982; since they are unenforceable, however, little effect has been seen from this proposal since its origin.
Farley suggests in the third section of her article that TK and TCE would probably be better protected by law beyond the traditional copyright paradigm. She offers the idea of "Moral Rights," which, although separate from economic rights, are usually viewed as unalienable and meant to protect the personality of the author from being misrepresented by unauthorized uses of his work. For example, European moral rights protect creative works from defacement. This law is promising but firmly based in the Romantic conception of singular authorship and therefore less appropriate for TK. Farley also suggests that even works in the public domain should be protected in order to maintain respect for the works: "Public domain works can be used as the basis of derivative works so long as the use does not violate the work's essence, cultural value, or reputation." A related concept that may be more beneficial for traditional cultures is the "domaine publique payant" suggested by Professor de Cunha. Farley offers the idea of combining copyright and trademark in "The Law of Unfair Competition," protecting indigenous works from unauthorized use for economic gain. Ultimately, Farley wonders, as does de Cunha, whether copyright or international legislation has yet found an ideal means of protecting TCE. [return to top]
37
The TRR approach draws on "basic human rights; the right
to self-determination; collective rights; land and territorial
rights; religious freedom; the right to development; the right
to privacy and prior informed consent; environmental integrity;
intellectual property rights; neighboring rights; the right
to enter into legal agreements; rights to protection of cultural
property, folklore and cultural heritage; the recognition
of cultural landscapes; recognition of customary law and practice;
and farmers' rights" (Programme for Traditional Resource
Rights, "What Are Traditional Resource Rights?").
See also, generally, Darrell A. Posey and Graham Dutfield,
Beyond Intellectual Property.
Traditional Resource Rights (TRR) describe the "bundle
of rights" assigned to the protection and conservation
of traditional resources. These rights have their origin in
Intellectual Property Rights, in which compensation and protection
are provided to those deemed by the law to be authors, creators,
or inventors. Traditional resources include any animal, plant,
or other object that possesses ceremonial, heritage, or aesthetic
qualities of a particular indigenous group and does not belong
to a particular individual. TRRs protect indigenous knowledge
and local resources by ensuring control over land territories
and resources before access and transfer of the indigenous
people's resources are threatened.
The Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property
Rights of Indigenous People was formed in 1993 after a six-day
conference.. Pursuant to this declaration, several indigenous
"statements" were created. These statements are
a collection of moral imperatives affirming that indigenous
people have the right to form and execute their own policies
to protect indigenous intellectual and cultural property.
Specifically, the statements include the Draft Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Suva Statement,
the Sabah Statement, the COICA Statement, and the Inuit
Tapirisat of Canada Principles.
[return to top]
38
According to one recent account, "In return for plant
and insect extracts and other samples, Merck gave INBio a
$1.14 million research and sampling budget, undisclosed royalties
on any new drugs that emerge, and technical assistance and
training for Costa Rican scientists. In turn, INBio agreed
to donate 10 percent of the upfront paytment and half of any
royalties they receive to conservation efforts in Costa Rica"
(Mary Parlange, "Eco-nomics"). The Merck-INBio agreement
has been criticized for failing to take into account the interests
of indigenous peoples within Costa Rica as well as the collective
national interest in ecological conservation, and for promoting
secrecy and exclusivity rather than information sharing.
[return to top]
39
See Peter Jaszi and Martha Woodmansee, "The Ethical Reaches of Authorship," 967-68. For a somewhat jaundiced view of Shaman's later fortunes, see "Ethnobotany: Shaman Loses Its Magic," 77. "The Ethical Reaches of Authorship," expresses many of the same concerns as does this collaboratory. The Convention on Biodiversity, founded in 1992, calls upon signatory countries to "share in a fair and equitable way the results of research and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources." This measure attempts to protect the cultures that offer plant or other natural resources from false patenting by (predominantly Western) companies, but still does not sufficiently cover the protection needs of indigenous bioknowledge. The Mataatua Declaration and the Bellagio Declaration are two measures that attempt to strike at the discourse underlying the law, and thus more effectively alter the law itself. The central elements of
the 1993 'Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples,' issued by an assembly of over 150 delegates from fourteen countries, calls on indigenous peoples to 'define for themselves their own intellectual and cultural property,' and on states to develop in full co-operation with indigenous peoples an additional cultural and intellectual property rights regime incorporating the following:
-
collective (as well as individual) ownership and origin
-
retroactive coverage of historical as well as contemporary works
-
protection against debasement of culturally significant items
-
co-operative rather than competitive framework
-
first beneficiaries to be the direct descendants of the traditional
-
Guardians of that knowledge
-
multi-generational coverage span.
The Bellagio Declaration had as its goal not only a system for the protection of TK and TCE, but also a revision of the doctrine of solitary authorship allowing for protection of collective and cultural works in general. An appendix to "The Ethical Reaches of Authorship" includes the full text of the Bellagio Declaration.
[return to top]
40
This plant, Trichopus zeylanicus, found in the tropical forests
of southwestern India, is collected by the Kani tribal people.
Writing for Science (March 12, 1999) Pallava Bagala
reports that scientists at the Tropical Botanic Garden and
Research Institute (TBGRI) in Trivandrum, Kerala, having isolated
and tested the ingredient, incorporated it into a compound,
which they named "Jeevani," giver of life. The tonic
is now being manufactured by the Aryavaidya Pharmacy Coimbtore
Ltd., a major Ayuvedic drug company. Quoting Graham Dutfield,
Bagala writes that "the process marks perhaps the first
time that cash benefits have gone directly to the source of
the knowledge of traditional medicines. 'It is a replicable
model because of its simplicity,' Dutfield says about a chain
of events that began well before the international biodiversity
treaty was signed. TBGRI scientists learned of the tonic,
which is claimed to bolster the immune system and provide
additional energy, while on a jungle expedition with the Kani
in 1987. A few years later, they returned to collect samples
of the plant, known locally as arogyapacha, and began laboratory
studies of its potency. In November 1995, an agreement was
struck for the institute and the tribal community to share
a license fee and 2 percent of net profits. Another agent
from the same plant is undergoing clinical tests for possible
use as a stamina-building supplement for athletes" (Bagala,
"Indian Deal Generates Payments").
[return to top] |