The "World Out There," the first showstopping tune of
Disney's Hunchback of Notre Dame, refers, in the immediate context
of the film, to the alleyways and marketplaces beyond the grand,
but stultifying confines of Notre Dame de Paris, as viewed longingly
by Quasimodo from his isolated perch in the belfry above. Full of
yearning, the song expresses Quasimodo's desire to be at liberty
among the masses on the street below, to exist freely and without
constraint outside the cloistered walls of the cathedral and beyond
the perverse, damaging ministrations of Archdeacon Frollo, in whose
narrow view, the "world out there"--a world of gypsies,
mountebanks, criminals, and other marginals--is dangerous and impure.
In a broader context, however, the "World Out There" refers
as well to an enlarged awareness of a global geography, urging,
on the part of its viewers, an acceptance of an ecumenical, not
parochial perspective and an unqualified participation in a New
World Order. It shares with other Disney film songs of the last
decade, i.e., Aladdin's "Whole New World," The Little
Mermaid's "Part of That World," a global orientation--the
"world out there"--and an underlying, (potentially globalizing)
leitmotif--the desirability of a world without boundaries as the
dynamic, utopian geography of endless possibilities and freedoms--in
line with Disney Corporation's global mission: to be the worldwide
leader in family entertainment.
As with many of its animated films released during the 90s, then,
Disney's The Hunchback of Notre Dame is, or can be read as, a corporate
response to (even allegory of) its position as a multinational company
engaged in subtle negotiations at the "contact zone" with
a recalcitrant, even defensive host nation--in this instance, a
beleaguered post-Cold War France obsessed with the integrity of
its national/cultural identity (the "French National Idea")
in the context of decolonization, European unification, and, importantly
for this paper, mondialization, read as Americanization, of which
Disney is the image and symbol. The anti-American thrust of French
debates over mondialization as Americanization involve critiques
of values--individualism, consumerism, relativism, and multiculturalism--that
constitute the core thematics of Disney's Hunchback, and that are
said to undermine French national culture. As Jean-Philippe Mathy
observes in French Resistance: The French-American Culture Wars,
Americanization [for which Disney is the metonym] . . . threatens
French society on all fronts: philosophically, it undermines the
meta-physical foundations of the republican project; economically,
it turns citizens into individualistic consumers and subjects the
national economy to the whim of transnational organizations; culturally,
it debases the high standards of the indigenous aesthetic canons
. . .displacing Versailles with Disneyland; politically, it dissolves
the shared values of citizenship into a neoromantic celebration
of diversity. (16)
Disney's Hunchback, then, can be read, as I will attempt to read
it, as a strategic intervention in the longstanding, on-going French-American
Culture Wars that have intensified over the past decade with the
installation of EuroDisney (now Disney Paris) and the commodification
and Disneyfication of French culture. This reading revisits a study
begun some years before at the Conference on Economic Criticism
sponsored by the SCE in which I read Disney's Beauty and the Beast
as an elaborate courtship of, and negotiation with, French public
opinion, in the context of GATT--the General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs--and hostile French reaction to what was perceived as
an assault on the French culture and film industries by Hollywood
and American media conglomerations. It is part of broader study
of how "classic" Disney feature animation--the staple
that saved Disney from impending financial ruin in the 80s and enabled
its prodigious growth in the 90s--and its representational strategies
have been impacted by its global mission to be the worldwide leader
in family entertainment.
In the ensuing discussion, I will touch on related concerns that
I believe are relevant to a discussion of Globalization and the
Image. The first are practices of Disneyworlding, or how the world
is packaged for consumption and culture is commodified in such venues
as movie complexes, theatrical showcases, and theme parks This consists
largely of the production and circulation of easy recognizable (cliched),
usually marketable and sometimes transportable simulacrum of national
culture, those signs or metonymic figures for any given geographical
location.
Hence " 'France' equals wine or baked goods" (Kuenz,
Inside the Mouse, 77), the can-can, cabaret, or Eiffel Tower, as
in Beauty and the Beast or, in the case of Hunchback, Notre Dame
Cathedral (which can't be sold literally, of course, but can be--and
has been--"sold," or promoted and packaged with EuroDisney
as an enticement to visit the park). As Susan Willis notes, through
the operations of Disneyworlding, consumers "fully participate
in the ideology of global capitalism, for which the duties of citizenship
are equated with the practice of shopping. Such a world offers each
and every shopper the experience of companionship with the rest
of the global community through purchases" (Inside the Mouse,
43).
However, Disneyworlding and other efforts to encompass the world's
peoples and cultures, sometimes as commodities, sometimes as markets,
sometimes as limited partners, often meet with resistance at national
or local levels, requiring practices involving protocols of relationality,
ways of engaging with and negotiating cultural "otherness"
and "difference" successfully or satisfactorily (from
a corporate perspective, at least). How that process is enacted
on a world stage by a multinational corporation sensitive to transnational
economic and cultural interests requiring subtle, bilateral negotiations
is often reflected in Disney's animated films through modeling the
courtesies, symbolic gestures, and procedures deemed most necessary
and appropriate in overcoming estrangement.
At the same time, the representational strategies Disney has deployed
in its animated features to smooth over differences and invite co-operation
have subjected it to criticisms from both the Left and Right over
"political correctness," related as well to Disney's efforts
to engage with questions of gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity
as it globalizes. (Mulan is a case in point--its "flirtation"
with Chinese culture in subject matter and visual style, in the
context of Disney's negotiations with the People's Republic of China
over copyright and markets, opened the film to charges of cultural
insensitivity, ethnic stereotyping, and racism, and the corporation
to charges of exploitation, co-optation and unpatriotic opportunism.)
The very success of the corporation in the 80s and 90s, both determined
by, and manifested in, its acquisitions and market penetration at
home and abroad, have increasingly complicated its representational
strategies, producing a conflicted corporate profile and product
line. Of interest to the study of the image and globalization is
a consideration of how Disney does difference, how it stages and
represents "otherness"--in particular, ethnically or racially
coded others--in an increasingly fraught representational field
in which representation in its dual sense--not only the "what"
of representation (the nature of its figuration), but the "who"
of representation (by whom and for whom it is produced) frequently
is the basis for fierce contestation. The point is not so much to
judge a particular figure--whether is is good or bad, that is, racist,
sexist, homophobic--though I hasten to add that such an evaluation
has its place--but rather to discuss how a subject is represented,
how it adopts or fundamentally alters an existing repertoire and
to what ends or purposes at a particular historical moment and why
(i.e., how do the representations of Esmerelda or Quasimodo draw
upon or deviate from those of the classic tale and earlier filmic
versions and why at a particular juncture of time and place?)
Before discussing the material and economic bases of Disney's
representational practices, specifically, how the images Disney
circulates address its corporate interests on a world stage, I should
add a somewhat perfunctory, but necessary word of caution--globalization
has been with us for some time. If by globalization one refers,
loosely, to the worldwide circulation of ideas, people, and products
enabled by improvements in communication and transportation and
underwritten, finally, by the flow of capital, as well as to the
effects of such a process, Disney can be said to have participated
in, and been impacted by, globalization since its inception. The
very idea of Main Street, U.S.A., which one associates with Walt
Disney and which bespeaks a provincial American outlook, is perhaps
best understood in the context of two turn-of-the-(twentieth) century
global phenomena: U.S. neo-imperialism and mass immigration to America.
It is no coincidence, as analysts have observed, that Main Street,
U.S.A. is at once the thoroughfare and gateway which orients and
disposes other countries and regions in Disney's themed Worlds.
As is well-known, since the release of Snow White, foreign markets
have assured the financial success of its animated features, and
the disruption or weakening of those markets--during World War II,
for example, when Pinocchio, considered by many to be a superior
technical and artistic production to Snow White, nearly sunk the
company--has guaranteed financial distress for the company. Further,
Disney animated features always have been impacted and marked by
global events and pressures, sometimes overtly (as with Dumbo and
World War II or The Three Cabelleros and the Good Neighbor Policy)
sometimes obliquely (as with Pinocchio and fascism or Aladdin and
the Gulf War. Nevertheless, there seems to have been a shift in
degree and kind concerning the impact of globalization on Disney
Corporation. This includes the use of foreign-based animation units
and production teams and "local" labor; substantial investments
abroad in TV stations, communication networks and theme parks; and
considerable revenues from overseas sources. These factors, in turn,
have influenced Disney's production and labor practices, distribution
and marketing, and, of crucial importance for this analysis, the
nature of its product and representational practices, including
choice of subject matter and themes. In this last regard, during
the Eisner years, there has been a heightened, sustained effort
to engage with other cultures and peoples, to model "appropriate"
interactions within diverse "contact zones" and to allegorize
its own position in cross-cultural exchanges. While Disney long
has allegorized its animated features, typically employing moral
and/or psychological abstractions as a framework of intelligibility
for public relations, but also referring to economic or political
realities and the corporate challenges posed within these spheres
as reference points (and while the medium itself encourages allegorical
readings), Disney's position as an embattled multinational corporation
(competing with other multinationals for markets, negotiating with
defensive governments, and contending with critics at home at abroad)
has only exacerbated a need for self-justification and self-congratulation
that finds expression in self-referential gestures--even corporate
allegories--within its animated releases.
_____________________________
Given its enormous successes in the 90s, it's difficult to imagine
Disney Corporation as every being embattled, but such was the case
both at the outset of Michael Eisner's tenure as Disney's CEO and
following his controversial decision to open EuroDisney, which forms
the immediate context for The Hunchback. One synopsis of the troubled
economic background to the making of Disney's "French"
films is as follows:
On September 22, 1984, Michael Eisner is voted chairman and chief
executive officer of Walt Disney Productions. His main job is to
garner revenues from as many sources as possible in order to raise
the price of Disney's undervalued stock and to save Disney from
a Wall Street takeover. An important component of his strategy for
recovery is globalization; Eisner recognizes the potential of what
has been called America's hottest export--American popular culture--which
includes the products and services Disney traditionally has been
expert in packaging and distributing: software (movies, music, television
programming) and licensed consumer goods. To this end, he targets
markets worldwide, delivering a record number of books and magazine
overseas, and, eventually, the Disney Store. Further, he ships work
overseas, employing cheaper labor for animation work.
As Disney Corporation intensifies its globalization, its products
take on an international flavor. From The Little Mermaid (Europe,
but with Caribbean accents) to The Jungle Book (South Asia)--the
first videocassette release of a Disney "classic"--to
Aladdin (The Middle East) to the Lion King
(Africa), Disney gives us the world, capitalizing on multiculturalism
while promoting its position in travel and tourism. For it had always
offered the promise of adventure in faraway places through transport
(via youthful imagination and the technology of its rides) and the
simulation of exotic locales, extending that promise to adults with
Epcot's World Showcase, a contemporary descendent of earlier World
Fairs and international exhibitions. Increasingly, the two venues
(movies and theme parks) reference each other, exhibiting the synergy
that Disney--and Eisner--hope to achieve: all Disney "channels"--parks,
movies, television programs, Disney Stores--are linked, gaining
interest from and promoting each other. The idea is not to make
anything that will sell only once. The Disney Corporation nears
the point where it resembles "less a collection of artists"
than "a franchiser with a line of products. . . replayed and
marketed at different times and in different places in an endless
loop for every generation."
The line of products includes theme parks. Disney hopes to replicate
the success of Tokyo Disneyland (opened 1983), but with a significant
difference: whereas Disney Corporation opted for limited participation
and investment in the Tokyo project, due to its fragile economic
position (considerable resources were committed to EPCOT, for example),
it aims instead for complete control of a new theme park in Europe.
Whereas it had settled for designing the Tokyo park and advising
its operators in return for ten percent of admission revenues and
five percent of concessions, leaving the Japanese owned Oriental
Land to build, own, and operate the park, Disney now aspires to
assume total responsibility for development within the park and
the peripheries. Disney's plan for a new theme park is the cornerstone
of Eisner's global vision for Disney's dominance of the international
market for family entertainment. Instead of bringing the world to
America (a world reduced to essences and then retailed as the "displaced
souvenirs of a trip never taken"), Disney aims at bringing
America to the world, at achieving synergy abroad.
In December, 1985, after engaging several countries in a bidding
war, Eisner signs an initial agreement with Laurent Fabius, prime
minister of France, for a multi-billion dollar theme park to be
built at Marne-la-Vallee, thirty miles east of Paris. The site is
chosen, despite its cool climate, because of location--it is near
major European population centers and is connected to them by efficient
transportation; it abuts a tourist Mecca: Paris--and because of
considerable concessions granted by the French government of Jacques
Chirac: France sells acreage at artificially low prices (1971 prices
for agricultural land), promises to improve access to the park,
and reduces by nearly two-thirds the amount of value-added tax Disney
will pay on every franc of goods sold. The opposition to the deal
cries sell-out.
In directing the flow of capital across international borders,
Disney joins other multinational corporations which attempt "to
survive and compete through the creation of branches and subsidiaries
throughout the world." At the same time, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks resume with the goal of opening
markets and promoting fair trade. At the decade's end, by some accounts,
the tenor of the discussion changes: GATT is "highjacked"
by big business; internationally-oriented companies and businesses
lobby to further deregulate trade and eliminate barriers to overseas
growth, and they labor to define to their advantage new areas on
the GATT agenda: intellectual property, services, and investments.
During the early 90s, GATT talks stall and threaten to collapse:
France, host country to EuroDisney, is at the center of resistance,
representing the interests of two powerful national industries:
farming and film making. The farmers wish to retain farm subsidies;
the film makers, to retain subsidies and maintain quotas to protect
a struggling industry. Both industries cry foul (the film industry,
for example, argues that free trade is not fair trade; having covered
costs at home with successful ventures, American film makers, the
argue, are able to distribute more widely, advertise more extensively,
and sell their product more cheaply); both cast their arguments
in nationalistic terms: what is at risk in GATT discussions, they
argue, is the heart and soul of France, its cultural identity, its
civilization. And their arguments are not without some foundation.
On the one hand, "authentic" French culture and French
values traditionally have been located in the countryside, which
exists, in the imagination of many, as a reservoir of essential
French qualities removed from contamination by outside/cosmopolitan
influences. Further, despite the fact that since 1970 more than
a million farm jobs have been lost, the number of farms have fallen
by half, and farms produce less than four percent of the country's
wealth, "France still sees itself as an agricultural nation."
On the other hand, French film, in addition to being the special
province and glory of France in the early years of the twentieth
century, has also been a primary medium for celebrating Frenchness
and establishing French identity (however narrowly in the opinion
of minority populations.) Finally, it must be added that the industry
increasingly is sensitive to questions of identity and difference
(hence the proliferation of "heritage" films during the
eighties) in response to a perception, in some quarters, of a growing
cultural "crisis" related to, not only the influx of American
popular culture, but also to France's participation in the EC and
to the increasingly visible presence of minority populations.
This, then, is the broad economic and cultural context--the global
politics--informing the production of Disney's "French"
films, Beauty and the Beast and The Hunchback of Notre Dame, as
well as my readings of the films. Beauty and the Beast, for example,
is productively read in the context of GATT and French resistance
to EuroDisney. A self-referential allegory, Beauty and the Beast
concerns the courtship of la Belle France and Disney (the bete noire
of American consumer culture) in the context of French concerns
about the cultural and economic impact of American popular culture.
The film not only is about courtship, but instantiates it through
its operations. The Beast offers la Belle France a marriage of convenience,
a chance to escape narrow provincialism and to profit by the arrangement;
for her part, Belle humanizes the beast with the ultimate French
gift--civilization. The proof of her efficacy lies in the extreme
politesse of the film itself; it repays its debts and displays its
gratitude by recognizing, through citation, a host of French cultural
contributions: the Caberet, Maurice Chevalier, Lumiere pictures,
Cocteau's La Belle et Le Bete, French cuisine and ambience. Finally,
Beauty and the Beast celebrates travel and entertainment and sells
tourism as intensive consumption, seducing (interpellating?) the
modern tourist, figured by Belle, with its vision of life within
the enchanted castle.
Belle's escape from the narrow prejudices of French provincialism
to the paradoxically expansive confines of the multinationally organized
and run enchanted castle is counterposed in its sequel, The Hunchback
of Notre Dame--by Quasimodo's escape from his cloistered existence
in the belltower to the parti-colored, multicultural dangerous mix
of the masses on the square below. As some critics have perceptively
observed, Quasi's desire to escape the confines of his closet, to
be outed, or be "out there," where Paris alternately flames
and is gay, is a not-so-veiled, in-house reference to Disney's purported
"gay agenda" and the attacks on Disney Corporation by
"family value" groups and Christian conservatives, figured
by Frollo, the tortured Minister of Justice who supervises and controls
the city through the punitive operations of the law. This swipe
at Disney's critics is also, as Sean Griffen notes in Tinker Belles
and Evil Queens, a gesture toward a market--the gay community--which
has loyally consumed, though in its own ways and for its own purposes,
the Disney Brand. Nonetheless, in The Hunchback, the list of victims
is broad-ranging, extending beyond a single group and including
the physically-challenged, the disenfranchised and hence criminalized
marginals, and finally, the ethnic and racial other, figured by
Esmerelda. Frollo's desire for purity and wholeness--he is torn
alternately between his fascination and loathing for Esmerelda,
by his lust and disgust--is only to be achieved by sacrificing her
at the stake, and his pursuit of her throughout the feature is,
finally, what drives the plot.
In the context of the contemporary European political scene, Frollo's
mission to rid Paris of Esmerelda and the rest of her gypsy band--to
eliminate all of Romany, in effect--resonates with the vocabulary
of ethnic cleansing deployed in discussions of the embattled Balkan
states, and this, in fact, is precisely the situation that Byrne
and McQuillian, authors of Deconstructing Disney, invoke in their
analysis of the animated feature. In their reading, "Frollo
demonstrates his Serbian credentials . . . when he burns down the
whole city of Paris in his search for Esmerelda." As provocative
as this suggestion is, it begs the question as to why Disney Corporation
would want to represent the crisis in the Balkans or figure Frollo
as a type of Milosavic. Not that a connection cannot be made and
Byrne and McQuillan, in fact, gesture in this direction. They suggest
that The Hunchback reminds France of its obligations to a larger
European community and, beyond that, to an even larger New World
Order, subtended by the economic clout and political might of the
United States. Ultimately, ethnic particularism and ethnic cleansing
mitigate against normalized relations between nations and the unencumbered
flow of goods and services and therefore must be opposed.
While critics might reasonably conclude with Byrne and McQuillan
that, as a MNC and proponent of neoliberalism, Disney desires the
unrestricted flow of goods and services in the marketplace, deregulated
and unsupervised from above, such as characterizes the economy of
the market square that Frollo ultimately is unable to control, they
may balk at accepting the framework of intelligibility--the New
Europe safeguarding the interests of a New World order in the Balkans--
informing their interpretation as being at once too removed from
the immediate concerns of the film and of the corporation. For a
film set in France and, like Hugo's novel, in some sense about France,
of which the Cathedral is both the sign and symbol, the most immediate
and obvious context for the film is the French nation and its crisis
within an emerging world order configuring itself according to the
imperatives of the realities and discourses of globalization. The
Balkans may figure in the film, but indirectly, not so much as an
invitation to accept a New World Order under the auspices of an
American-controlled NATO, but as one more occasion for the nation
to reflect on its troubled, collaborationist past, its inability
or refusal to intervene during the dark Vichy years for basic human
rights for some notion of the integral, pure French nation. Or the
Balkans may figure as one more regional trouble spot releasing refugees
and immigrants across increasingly open borders and, in the process,
threatening a settled sense of national identity. These matters
were, in fact, at the center of a heated debate among French intellectuals
concerning the role of France in the Balkans, a debate that was
part of a larger national dialogue concerning French identity in
the wake of globalization and the flow of ideas, products and people
across national boundaries. As an agent of mondialization whose
successful operations in France require a large multinational workforce
and a broad consumer base, Disney had much at stake in that dialogue
over the impact of migration/immigration and mondialization as Americanization
on French national identity, especially as it figured as a specific
referent in many of those discussions.
A significant part of the dialogue concerned the place of the
universal in French political identity. According to Naomi Schor,
"if there is one difference between the two cultures [that
of the United States and France] that hold maximum explanatory power
in this context it is the significance in France of the notion of
the universal, and of France and its language as its measure, the
French nation as its embodiment, the French Revolution as its praxis."
According to this way of thinking, the universal and undifferentiated
French Republic is fundamentally opposed to the fractious and relativistic
liberal democracies of the Anglo-American political tradition, which
are steeped in notions of individual, not collective rights, and
the tenets of neo-liberalism. The universal French model is "a
national model of integration as the only defense against boundless
liberalism, hyperindividualism, the dissolution of the social fabric,
and the wholesale destruction of civic virtues." In this view,
the enemy of univeralism is, by turns, particularism and pluralism,
both conducive to a destabilizing multiculturalism, or differentialisme,
the values and programs of which, strange to say for an organization
known for its mainstream conservativism, are celebrated (topsy-turvy)
in Disney's Hunchback of Notre Dame.
An appropriate context, then, for allegorizing Disney's Hunchback
is the French-American culture wars precipitated by the influx of
American services and goods--electronic media, in particular, and
fears surrounding the impact of American economic and political
ideals and values on French national identity in a period of crisis
following the after-effects of decolonization, mass immigration,
and, most recently, increasing globalization. A specific context
is the ascendancy of Jean-Marie Pen and the National Front, opposed
to the U.S. domination of popular culture and Disney's role in such.
Its resistance is marked by "a new protectionism [which] includes
a call for the protection of the cultural sphere," wherein
"the free market is placed in opposition to national identity."
The Front's xenophobic, anti-immigrant messages the face of "a
rising tide of mainly North African and Muslim faces," whose
"foreign" presence is linked to urban delinquency and
crime, "fits" the Hunchback well, which opens, fittingly
enough, with the failed attempt by an impoverished gypsy family
to sneak into Paris under cover of darkness, where they are summarily
arrested and dispatched. This focus on immigration, which is absent
in the novel and which frames the film, signposting one of its concerns,
establishes a contemporary framework for understanding the racial
politics of the film--the presence of a significant Beur population
whose presence has challenged a universal conceptualization of settled
French identity.
In addition to rehearsing contemporary anti-immigrant sentiment,
Frollo's efforts to exterminate the "colony" of orientalized
gypsies who have, contra the law, found safe haven within the walls
of Paris and who, according to Frollo, live "outside the normal
order," alludes as well to the dark days of the Vichy regime
when Jews, the initial racialized other of Europe, were identified
and deported. In this regard, the Hunchback's deployment of visual
references to collaboration with, and resistance to, National Socialism,
is not a complacent, empty gesture, as Byrne and McQuillan contend,
but, rather, a loaded reference to a volatile debate in the late
eighties and early nineties, in precisely these freighted terms,
concerning the presence of the Nazi past in France's contemporary
national formation, stimulated by high-profile trials of French
officials with a dubious pasts. As an "international"
proponent of the free market (with a Jewish CEO no less), Disney's
response is hardly gratuitous or disinterested, but constitutes
an intervention into a representational field, depicting Frollo
as the true enemy of the national polity, his xenophobia fanning
the flames of intolerance that promise to incinerate the city.
Interestingly, scapegoating Frollo, who is further marginalized
through attributing to him a twisted sexual orientation (i.e., the
sadomasochistic dungeon scene where, when lashing a barely culpable
prisoner, Frollo anticipates with glee that Phoebus his captain
will "whip them [his guard] into shape") splits him from
the rest of the French polity and saves the film from being a sweeping
indictment of all Frenchmen. By the same token, while rejecting
Frollo's rhetoric of exclusion by demonstrating its dangers, the
Hunchback also rejects the Republican solution of absorption and
assimilation often held out as the appropriate French response to
its identity crisis. The film champions not the universal rights
of citizens in accordance with a French Republican model, but rather
the rights of individuals, whose personal tastes and preferences--their
differences--are expressed and affirmed in the marketplace. The
liberal commonplace that there's no accounting for taste is memorably
captured when Victor, Hugo, and Laverne, the three talking gargoyles
of Notre Dame and Quasi's companion in his sequestration, conjure
up quite different versions of their dream dates--including Hugo's
fantasy of Esmerelda's goat.
Though this scenario would only seem to confirm one's worst fears
about relativism, it also raises questions, with a sidelong glance
at Frollo, the twisted Minister of Justice whose efforts to maintain
the "normal" order of things pervert him, as to what constitutes
perversion or normalcy and who ultimately has the power to decide.
Quasimodo, like Esmerelda, is outside the "normal" order
of things by design. The suggestion is that he is disabled, not
by his physical limitations, but by the prejudices of others and,
more significantly, by the discourse of inadequacy and abnormality
that keeps him dependent on Frollo for the Minister's own dark purposes.
As Quasi asserts himself with the help of friends, he gradually
disentangles himself from Frollo's monstrous designs, establishing
self-reliance, not welfare as the logical requirement of freedom.
In the context of the French welfare state and an economy weakened
(with consequences for Disney), from a neo-liberal perspective,
by entitlements and handouts, this is a powerful critique aimed
once again at dismantling the centralizing assumptions and tendencies
of a paternalistic French nation state. Like Beauty and the Beast,
then, the Hunchback of Notre Dame can be viewed as an intervention
into a debate over mondialization, which is also a debate over the
impact of individualism and the "free market" on French
society. It celebrates what one critic has called "the multi-cultural
fun fair" operating within an open economy promising the satisfaction
of individual tastes and preferences. Opposing regulation from above
and absolutist positions, the Hunchback takes on the rhetoric of
exclusion circulating within France that, directed at foreign internationals
and immigrant populations, has produced a chilling climate for Disney's
multinational operations in France.
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